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Abstract 
 
The aim of this work is to argue against the utilitarian framework which underpins care 
provision in the United Kingdom as the cause of many contemporary care problems. 
In the course of this work I identify feminist theories which I argue provide a more 
appropriate basis for care in the future. I discuss the assumptions built on gendered 
expectations, analysing the ways in which they particularly affect women. I consider 
factors including how care is in the process of transformation in other countries and 
whether they have a feminist influence. I analyse arguments of risk in care and 
examine the role of local authorities and the way the court approaches challenges to 
care plans. Finally I consider practical care technology and the application of 
paternalism in care practice. I argue that a feminist approach would provide a more 
human, responsive manner in which to practice care which focuses on the individual.  
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Introduction 
 
I was inspired to conduct this research because I have a longstanding interest in adult 
social care, stemming from employment in a care home during my younger years. My 
interest increased while studying Public Law as an undergraduate and adult social 
care was the subject of my dissertation. During that time, the Care Act 2014 was 
developed. The Act represented the biggest reconsideration of adult social care for 
over sixty years. Although it was seen as a breakthrough for those involved in care, it 
has not addressed some of the most critical problems in contemporary care. In recent 
years there has been a crisis of care in the UK including the collapse of Southern 
Cross in 2011 and the Winterbourne View scandal in 2012.1  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine why the state uses a utilitarian 
framework to think about care. I offer feminism as an alternative approach which 
I argue could lead to more progressive outcomes in connection with state 
provision of care. I am not claiming to discuss all the problems of adult social care, 
nor do I attempt to solve the problems I identify. I am instead arguing we need to think 
differently about the problems of care and I suggest feminism may provide a more 
nuanced approach.  
 
My research has been desk based, using a variety of sources to support my 
arguments. I have considered the main works of authors relating to the central theories 
                                                          
1 Carr, H., ‘Legal Technology in an Age of Austerity: Documentation, ‘Functional’ Incontinence and the 
Problem of Dignity in Exploring the ‘Legal’ in Socio-Legal Studies’ in Cowan, D., and Wincott, D., 
(eds) (Palgrave 2016).  
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of this work and positive and negative critiques of each. To develop my arguments I 
sought out leading academic writers in adult social care and pinpointed works which 
enrich my thesis. I have also identified case law which I discuss with a particular focus 
on judicial reasoning. It should be noted that there are relatively few adult social care 
cases which reflects the difficulties facing vulnerable people seeking to challenge local 
authority decisions.  My thoughts around technology tend to draw on unreported cases 
relating to failings in health and safety. I have also used newspaper articles and blog 
posts because these provide useful opinions about recent developments or concerns 
in care. These articles and posts have helped me ensure this work has remained up 
to date. 
  
In the first chapter I argue that utilitarianism provides the philosophical basis for current 
care policies. Utilitarianism, I suggest, has informed not only our thinking about care 
but has caused many of the ongoing difficulties. I discuss the theory of utilitarianism 
developed by J.S. Mill which was considered progressive in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.2 A utilitarian response led to the development of the welfare state 
which was introduced to provide support to those who needed it. However resources 
have always been constrained, subsequently reinforcing utilitarian blanket policies 
which fail to address individual needs adequately. In response to resources becoming 
ever more stretched in the welfare state, levels of bureaucracy have increased 
correspondingly. I argue that in turn, bureaucracy has led to a seemingly impenetrable 
system for those subject to it. As a result it can be difficult to challenge decisions made 
by the state and this is particularly apparent where vulnerable people are concerned. 
                                                          
2 Mill, J.S., What Utilitarianism Is (Parker, Son and Bourne, London 1863). 
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I argue that utilitarianism has led to a particular masculinist approach to the problems 
of state provision of care.  
 
I discuss the Supreme Court case of McDonald.3 Ms McDonald’s argument focused 
on her dignity whereas the local authority, supported by the decision of the court, 
focused on the best uses of resources, which is an implicit utilitarian approach. As 
care demands primarily affect women, in the second chapter I consider feminist 
approaches as an alternative way of thinking about care. I focus on Carol Gilligan’s 
ethics of care and Martha Fineman’s vulnerability approach.4 5 I argue that social care 
is a feminist concern because, although women’s activity in the paid workforce has 
increased, expectations that women will provide care have not diminished. The 
pressures of meeting each of these roles has resulted in adverse impacts on women’s 
health. Gilligan’s ethics of care argues that society has been built around male 
interests, and a shortage of state resources have increased pressure on women to 
deliver care where there are gaps in provision. The failure to engage more men in care 
further reinforces ideas that women should provide care. I examine a critique of the 
ethic of care which focuses on the need to raise the awareness of women in relation 
to the detrimental effects of expectations of care which reinforces normalised male 
biased interests.6 I discuss Fineman’s theory in the context of universal human 
vulnerability and suggest that building resilience enables individuals to develop coping 
strategies at times of increased vulnerability.  Once we recognize that all humans are 
                                                          
3 R (On the application of McDonald) (Appellant) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 
(Respondent) [2011] UKSC 33. 
4 Gilligan, C., In a different voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Vol 326 (Harvard 
University Press 1982).  
5 Fineman, M and Grear, A. (eds), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and 
Politics (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2013). 
6 Hemmings, C., ‘Affective Solidarity: Feminist Reflexivity and political transformation’ Feminist Theory 
[2012] 13(2) 147-161.  
Laura Wares ʹ LLM by Research 
 
8 
 
dependant, open debate between citizens and governments can identify and address 
care problems collaboratively. Fineman notes that vulnerable groups are often labelled 
and marginalized, and I discuss this concern in particular relation to people subject to 
ASBOs.7 Lastly I examine critiques of Fineman from the viewpoint of women of colour 
which argue that we cannot assume all women have the same lived or cultural 
experiences.8  
 
In the third chapter I argue that feminism can provide a more productive way to think 
about adult social care. I identify two cases where adults with needs are subject to 
significant care provision by their parents.9 The cases illustrate the assumptions that 
both local authorities and judges make when parents, particularly mothers, are 
responsible for caring for adult children. I use these cases and academic arguments 
to establish that this kind of care is considered to be a private concern,10  which 
reduces the responsibility of local authorities to support care while reinforcing 
gendered expectations about women. The final section compares UK approaches to 
adult social care provision with those of the Netherlands and Canada.11 I discuss how 
far feminism has influenced these approaches and whether it has produced change 
and better solutions. I analyse whether public discourse has been effective in changing 
                                                          
7 De Verteueil, G., May, J. and von Mahs, J., ‘Complexity not collapse, recasting the geographies of 
homelessness in a punitive age’ Progress in Human Geography [2009] 33(5): 646-666.  
8 Crenshaw, K. W., Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics (University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 1989) 139-67. Reprinted in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, 195-217. Second 
edition, edited by David Kairys (Pantheon 1990). 
9 R (On the application of JM and NT) [2011] EWHC 2911 (Admin) and R (On the application of KM) 
(by his mother and litigation friend JM) (FC) (Appellant) v Cambridgeshire County Council 
(Respondent) [2012] UKSC 23.  
10 Clements, L., Disability, Dignity and the Cri de Couer European Human Rights Law Review [2011] 
6 675-685. 
11 Sevenhuijsen, S., ‘The Place of Care: The Relevance of the Feminist Ethic of Care for Social 
Policy’ Feminist Theory [2003] August 4:179.; Bacchi, C., Mainstreaming Politics Gendering Practices 
and Feminist Theory (Cambridge University Press 2012).  
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the way care is considered and practiced and whether there has been a reimagining 
of gendered roles. Although I acknowledge that the cost of care is an important factor, 
this thesis does not address the ways and extent to which is should be considered in 
developing care policies.12 My argument is simply that a utilitarian approach to cost 
should not be the only consideration in developing a policy on social care.  
 
The fourth chapter returns to the UK and discusses risk.13 I suggest that utilitarianism 
leads to a heightened awareness of risk and argue that feminism could offer a more 
nuanced approach. I consider the way local authorities evaluate risk and note where 
utilitarian arguments cannot be invoked to implement a care plan, paternalism will be 
adopted leading to restrictions on the liberty of the vulnerable adult. I evaluate the way 
that informed risk is applied to those that lack mental capacity and how views of local 
authorities, carers and family members can dominate the interests of the cared for.14 
I discuss the influence of paternalism through a consideration of risk and where 
problems arise in connection with individuals who lack capacity. I do not discuss 
paternalism as a theory in and of itself but, rather, as an approach that is adopted by 
councils when utilitarian rationalism is inappropriate.  
  
I evaluate the way in which care plans are legal technologies which have significant 
influence on individual lives.15 I discuss the position of social workers who may have 
                                                          
12 There are ways to address the issue of cost. For example, in the Netherlands the social cost of care 
is raised in the context of life planning and investment of the present generation for the older. 
Moreover, Fineman’s ideas about developing resilience could lead to fewer economic demands on 
the state.   
13 Beck, U., Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage Publications 1992) and Giddens, A., 
Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping Our Lives (Routledge: New York 1999). 
14 Marchant, S., Risky Business – A Joseph Rowntree Scoping Paper: Rights, Responsibilities, Risk 
and Regulation (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2011). 
15 Carr (n1) 204-205. 
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a relationship with the individual as well as being critically aware of restricted state 
resources. I return to the case of McDonald as a means to analyse risk and resource 
availability in the eyes of the courts and local authorities. I use other cases to discuss 
the way in which family members of individuals without capacity have been 
constructed by local authorities as posing a risk to them, particularly when a local 
authority is trying to provide what it sees as safe care.16 Family members were framed 
as risky because they either resisted a reduction in local authority support or were 
seen to be preventing the successful implementation of a care plan. The last case I 
discuss considers an individual with fluctuating capacity who opposed the paternalistic 
proposals the local authority wished to implement.17 When each of these cases came 
before the court the judges repositioned the individual at the centre of the care plan 
and resisted local authority paternalism.  
 
 In the final chapter I argue that care technology has been increasingly used as a 
response to a shortage of carers and restricted resources. In viewing technology as 
one of the solutions to the problems of care, I argue that the concerns associated with 
it have become an emerging problem in themselves.  I consider two particular care 
technologies, hoists and surveillance equipment. I consider the use of hoists through 
case law which has involved serious injury or death.18 These cases are not examined 
in the courts as a failure of good care but instead as breaches of health and safety 
law. I consider the use of surveillance using both analogous situations and academic 
                                                          
16 A London Local Authority v JH [2011] EWHC 2420 (Fam) and Local Authority X v MM (by her 
litigation friend the Official Solicitor) KM [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam). 
17 Re KK; CC v KK, (2012) EWHC 2136 (COP).  
18 For example; Care home operator fined £100,000 for hoist death www.mackworth-
healthcare.com/care-home-operator-fined-100000-for-hoist-death/2013 (January 11th 2013). 
Laura Wares ʹ LLM by Research 
 
11 
 
works.19 I focus on the pros and cons of using tagging for those with dementia who 
often lack capacity to consent to surveillance. I consider the influence utilitarianism 
has had in relation to the use of care technology, arguing that fails to treat care as a 
responsive practice. In turn this treats dementia patients as subjects of care rather 
than considering benefits for them as individuals.20 
 
 I discuss the way dementia care has developed with a focus on eliminating risk, 
meaning that we fail to work at understanding how to control and manage the 
vulnerable adult’s behaviour.  I analyse who benefits from care technology and the 
sometimes conflicting viewpoints of carers, family members and local authorities.21 I 
argue feminism may be a more productive way to apply care technology and discuss 
the importance of the human touch in care. I use case law to articulate the importance 
of human responsiveness in care.22 Finally I argue against the temptation to reduce 
care staff in favour of technology and evaluate whether care technology improves care 
or whether it simply enables numbers of care staff to be reduced.23 I argue that patient 
interest should always be prioritised. I discuss how the utilitarian approach has led to 
increased care technology because of economic factors and has resulted in 
detrimental effects on care provision. I argue that care staff will also suffer from 
overuse of care technology because they will not be able to build and benefit from 
reciprocal relationships with those they care for.  
                                                          
19 Hughes, J.C., and Louw, S.J., ‘Electronic tagging of people with dementia who wander’ British 
Medical Journal [2002] (October) 19; 325 (7369) 847.  
20 O’Neill, D., ‘Should patients with dementia who wonder be electronically tagged? No.’, British 
Medical Journal [2013] 346 f3 606,607.   
21 Niemeijer, A., Surveilling autonomy, securing care – Exploring good care with surveillance 
technology in residential care for vulnerable people (VU University Press, Amsterdam 2015). 
22 R (on the application of A) v East Sussex County Council (No.2) 6 CCL Rep 194.   
23 Astell, A.J., ‘Technology and personhood in dementia care’ Quality in Ageing [2006] 7, 15-25. 
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Chapter One - Utilitarianism and the contemporary welfare state 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I examine the ways utilitarianism has influenced welfare policy within 
the UK’s liberal democratic state. Although utilitarianism had considerable advantages 
when it was introduced in the nineteenth century, it has reached the limits of its 
usefulness.  Utilitarianism has contributed to production of a paradigmatic legal 
subject, overlooking individual needs and tends towards creation of policy that is not 
attuned to the needs of vulnerable individuals.  
 
The chapter begins by explaining the emergence of utilitarianism in the United 
Kingdom. I focus on the contribution of John Stuart Mill. Mill moved away from the 
approach formulated by his predecessors (John Austin, Jeremy Bentham and John 
Mill) which was founded upon notion of moral values focusing instead on maximisation 
of pleasure for the majority and advantages associated with that principle.24 I show 
how this shift led to formation of the paradigmatic legal subject which is self-
supporting, male and economically valuable. I will illustrate why utilitarianism as a 
reformist theory is considered and identified as a consequentialist approach which is 
inappropriate to care.25  
 
                                                          
24 West, H.R (eds). The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism (Blackwell Publishing 2006) 27.  
25 West (n24) defines consequentialism as acts deemed right or wrong based on their end result. 
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In the next part I examine how far utilitarianism continues to influence the 
contemporary welfare state. Utilitarianism places significant weight on importance of 
welfare maximisation of the majority, which can be linked to the original intentions of 
the welfare state. I analyse how the combination of utilitarianism and welfare state 
have resulted in the growth in bureaucracy, leading to a system which routinely fails 
to prioritise individual need and instead rations state resources. I consider how far this 
approach has forced individuals to compete for limited resources. 
 
The following section focuses on critiques of utilitarianism. I argue that broad-brush 
policies are inadequate mechanisms to allocate care resources including carers, 
money and practical equipment to support care needs.  Utilitarian policies fail to 
acknowledge the reality of the human condition and the need for nuance. I rely on 
Rosen’s criticism of Mill’s theory as implying a static view of society which restricts 
opportunities for discussion about change.26 If debate is stifled it can lead to injustice 
being overlooked and allows inequities to continue. Additionally I argue that if the 
paradigm group is male, responsible and active in the workforce, those individuals will 
take preference over everybody else.27  
 
The third part of the chapter considers gender and male bias. I use Bryson’s work to 
identify why utilitarianism is problematic in this regard.28 I evaluate Conaghan’s 
arguments about how utilitarianism has influenced judicial thinking.29 I evaluate how 
law tends to focus on discrete groups in the public realm. I argue that burdens placed 
                                                          
26 Rosen, F., Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill (Routledge Ltd., 2003).   
27 The utilitarian approach is based on the importance of males. I explain that in more depth 
throughout the chapter.  
28 Bryson, V., Feminist Debates – Issues of theory and political practice (Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999).  
29 Conaghan, J., Law and Gender (Oxford University Press 2013).  
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on people by utilitarianism are unreasonable as utilitarianism fails to recognise 
individuality in a way that means many people involved in care practice are 
overlooked. The failure to ignore caring responsibilities results from a deficiency to 
adequately acknowledge the private realm. I argue that the utilitarian approach is 
based on the idea that adult, educated males are the most important people in society.  
 
Finally I draw on the case of McDonald to evaluate judicial thinking about adult social 
care. I argue that jurisprudence focuses on utilitarian values of resources and 
outcomes and produced an unsatisfactory approach for the individual. I argue that the 
majority judgment effectively led to individual needs and wishes being overlooked.  
 
2. The theory of utilitarianism 
 
Bentham, a leading utilitarian philosopher, expounded the idea that if we behaved 
morally we would avoid hurting others.30 He attributed considerable importance to 
happiness, believing that basic pleasures were as important as sophisticated ones. 
Bentham was criticised for that evaluation31 and further chided for equating the 
pleasures of humans with animals, believing their experiences to be more or less 
equal.32 Mill developed and refined Bentham’s approach, moving away from ideas 
connected to moral notions. He suggested, in contrast to Bentham, that some 
pleasures were more valuable than others.33 In particular, Mill valued intellectual 
                                                          
30 West (n24) 28. 
31 Ibid 28.  
32 West (n24) 38. 
33 Ibid 124. 
Laura Wares ʹ LLM by Research 
 
15 
 
pleasure as opposed to basic sensual pleasure.34 In contrast with Bentham, Mill 
distinguished between humans and animals believing that intellectual pleasures were 
different from those animals might experience, including happiness.  
 
Mill highlighted the importance that utilitarianism places on the value of happiness to 
everyone.35 Universal happiness is a desirable end result for the majority, not merely 
a means to an end. The foundation of utilitarianism as a way in which to structure 
duties, virtues and rights cannot be underestimated. These values acquire their worth 
from their contribution to general happiness.36 Mill’s focus concerned moulding people 
into balanced and conscientious individuals.37 He believed this would result in 
individuals behaving in ways which would enhance wider society’s happiness 
instinctively.38 Mill emphasised the importance of happiness maximisation for all as he 
thought this would prevent people being purely directed by self-interest.39 Yet Mill did 
not advocate self-sacrifice as a matter of course, simply as a means to increase 
happiness as a goal for everyone.40 He argued that if negative consequences could 
be foreseen, most would avoid engaging in selfish behaviour.41 Nevertheless Mill was 
not confident that individuals would act independently for the benefit of society, 
establishing himself as a rule utilitarian.42 
 
                                                          
34 West (n24) 117.  
35 Rosen (n26) 286. He discusses ‘Enlightenment’ in reference to eighteenth century European 
thought.   
36 Mill (n2) 7.  
37 Capaldi, N., John Stuart Mill: A Biography (Cambridge University Press 2004).  
38 Hoag, R. W., Happiness and Freedom: Recent work on John Stuart Mill Philosophy and Public 
Affairs [1986] Vol.15, No.2 (Spring) 188-199.  
39 West (n24) 3.  
40 Hoag (n38) 192.  
41 Ibid 3.  
42 Mill advocated a system of rules which would regulate certain situations. West (n24) 3. 
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Mill’s belief was that an act can be viewed as positive if it leads to good for everybody.43 
As a rule utilitarian Mill believed people would not act in pursuit of general happiness 
unless they felt obliged to.44  He supported the development of a moral code which 
would cover particular circumstances, strongly advocating a system of sanctions for 
not following utility principles.45  Mill did not believe that there should be room to make 
an individual evaluation of potential consequences each and every time.46 The result 
of that approach is significant because it justified development of universal policies 
which may not be appropriate for everyone. Nevertheless Mill took a broad approach, 
looking beyond the individual and at their wider environment. In taking this expansive 
viewpoint, Mill considered what effects environment could have on people and how 
behaviour was influenced.47 His considerations recognise that we do not operate as 
solitary actors but instead as part of a wider group.48 He recognised that behaviour 
was part of a bigger debate about society, its structures and what most of us would 
deem acceptable.49  
 
Mill valued society’s strength of conscience whether it had foundations in childhood 
teaching or through disapproval from fellow man or God.50 He believed that the apex 
moral sanction would be individual subjective feeling while arguing that morality was 
acquired, not innate.51 Therefore principles of moral value and potential happiness 
would need to be taught to children. Mill’s view is open to criticism because values 
                                                          
43 In contrast, act utilitarians believe that an act is positive only if it produces a similar degree of 
happiness as any other act that the individual could have performed at that time.  
44 West (n24) 84. 
45 Ibid 3. 
46 West (n24) 3.  
47 Ibid 59.  
48 West (n24) 87. 
49 Ibid 58-59. 
50 West (n24) 85. 
51 Ibid 86.  
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and morals vary between societies and cultures and this is a weakness in utility 
arguments. Notwithstanding, in light of the previous influences of religion, when 
utilitarianism was introduced it acted as a significant means of reform which I now 
explore further.    
 
2(i) Utilitarianism as a means for reform 
 
Utilitarianism was adopted as an alternative to the previous regime which emphasised 
religion. Christianity teaches followers that suffering is noble and poor people, passive 
regarding social conditions, would get to Heaven.52 Although Mill’s framework was rule 
based, it was flexible and encompassed a wider range of issues.53 Mill placed trust in 
utilitarianism, believing that as time progressed, it would become natural for individuals 
to act as members of larger society.54 For Mill, political progress would make this 
increasingly possible, clearing away self-interest55 and that existing inequalities of 
legal privilege across social classes and between individuals would be removed.56 Mill 
thought that those who found themselves in marginalised positions would be identified 
and brought back into the fold,57 which, in turn, would mean that they would ultimately 
be better placed to offer support to others.  
 
Some commentators, including Wendy Donner, argue Mill’s theory was progressive 
because it was based on ideas of activism and was reformist.58 She states that the 
                                                          
52 This ties in with Donner’s argument.  
53 Rosen (n26) 2. 
54 Ibid 87. 
55 West (n24) 88. 
56 Ibid 88. 
57 West (n24) 87. 
58 Ibid 117.  
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foundation for Mill’s theory of value is its recognition of the existence of suffering and 
knowledge of suffering is critical to advancement of ethical life.59 Donner claims Mill’s 
approach expands the idea that utility operates as the primary assumption of moral 
standards, 60 arguing that Mill suggested value was part of a system of recognition of 
psychological processes built on consciousness.61  
 
Mill’s approach implies that consciousness develops over time and his means of 
measuring value and what is constituted as good depended on the judgements of 
“competent agents”.62 However, for Mills these “competent agents” were educated, 
adult males, with the result that his work carried a masculine bias.63 Mill’s system of 
measurement depended on the judgements of those men to make conclusions.64  
 
As a result, Mill’s understandings were based on evidence provided by others yet 
limited to a localised section of society.65 Nevertheless Donner supports Mill’s theory 
of value as one which allows for differences of opinion.66 As society changes we 
should welcome fields of thought that permit and foresee diversity among “educated 
and trained agents” as beneficial.67 Donner identifies that Mill has been criticised by 
‘value pluralists’ who argue that happiness is not the only factor we should value.68 
Mill counteracts that by agreeing that pleasure cannot be measured as an abstract 
                                                          
59 West (n24) 117. 
60 Ibid 118. 
61 West (n24) 120. 
62 Ibid 120.  
63 West (n24) 128-129. It is critical to remember that in Mill’s lifetime (1806-73) comparatively few 
women or poor people received the education that rich males did. 
64 Ibid 124.  
65 Mill’s “competent agents” were educated, adult males.  
66 West (n24) 124. 
67 Ibid 124.  
68 Value pluralism refers to acknowledgement that value systems differ according to where we live 
and distinct rules can be developed by those in power as a result.  
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notion.69 Value is not attached because of the amount we possess but instead the way 
it makes lives valuable. Mill believed that socialised, educated individuals were more 
able to achieve satisfaction in their lives and could contribute effectively to wider 
society.70 He advocated that not only abiding by society’s accepted rules is valuable 
but also the actions we choose to take.71   
 
On Donner’s analysis, utilitarianism was progressive and could respond to societal 
changes.72 Utilitarianism was built upon foundations of ideas about civil liberties and 
influenced by the Enlightenment.73 It increased the growth of markets where people 
could trade and interact more freely.74 Utilitarianism as promoted by Mill led to a more 
flexible structure of rules being developed. The aim of adopting this set of rules was 
to enhance the concept of liberty, increasing happiness of individuals.75  
 
Additionally the utilitarian state placed weight placed on whether individuals felt that 
established rules and laws were appropriate.76 Utilitarianism was valuable as it offered 
individuals the opportunity to express dissatisfaction through voting which had not 
previously been available.77  However, at the time Mill wrote comparatively few people 
were able to vote, 78 and, thus, reform of law in the utilitarian system was in the hands 
of the minority – men with property. As well as excluding many people, utilitarianism 
                                                          
69 West (n24) 125.  
70 Ibid 129. 
71 West (n24) 129. 
72 Ibid 5.  
73 Rosen (n26) 286.  
74 West (n24) 27. 
75 Rosen (n26) 291.  
76 West (n24) 97, 98. 
77 Rosen (n26) 288. 
78 Restricted to adult, landowning males and comprised of under 3% of the population in England and 
Wales. 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/citizenship/struggle_democracy/getting_vote.htm  
Accessed January 3rd 2016.  
Laura Wares ʹ LLM by Research 
 
20 
 
has contributed significantly to the formation of the exemplar citizen in the liberal state. 
The problems associated with the construction of this individual will be explored in the 
next section. 
 
2(ii). The influence of utilitarianism on the British state 
 
Utilitarianism’s persuasive influence on the UK can be seen most clearly in the 
formation of the liberal paradigm subject. The paradigm subject can be traced to the 
evolution of the ‘ideal’ citizen in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During this 
period, the archetypal individual was framed as male, self-supporting and 
independent.79 As a result, people who fall outside this framework, including those 
needing support, became viewed as exceptions to the norm. The primary function of 
the model citizen was active engagement in the labour market and responsibility. 
Therefore this person was identified as a localised, disembodied and rational being, 
linked to the autonomous, juridical individual of liberal legalism.80 The development of 
this legal subject can be connected to increasing structures of control and discipline 
emerging at that time.81   
 
These legal subjects who work, with no requirement for state support, have clear 
economic benefits. Utilitarianism has ignored the biological reality of being human and 
needs resulting from that, instead favouring pursuit of economic directives.82 The 
                                                          
79 Camic, C., ‘The Utilitarians Revisited’ American Journal of Sociology [1979] Vol.85, No.3 
(November) 519, 516-550. Accessed December 18th 2015.  
80 Grant, R.W., ‘Passion and Interest Revisited: the psychological foundations of economics and 
politics’  Public Choice – “Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus” [2008] 137 (3/4), 451-61. 
81 Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison (Translated by A. Sheridan). (Penguin, 
London 1975). Pdf available at: 
https://zulfahmed.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/disciplineandpunish.pdf  
82 That argument has been widely discussed by feminists and will be explored further in the second 
and third chapters.  
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resulting invisibility of individual embodiment has been connected with the disparity in 
growing corporate embodiment.83 As businesses grow, increased importance is 
placed on self-interest in the marketplace.84 Priority has been attached to ownership 
of property and growth of business.85 The utilitarian state led to developments in the 
economic market enabling people to trade more easily.86 The marketplace has taken 
precedence over individuals who have instead become the focus of attention in the 
welfare state.  
 
3. Utilitarian influence on contemporary welfare 
 
For modern utilitarians, the focus of the theory rests on achieving welfare maximisation 
for the majority. Yet this focus is open to criticism because it presupposes that 
individuals make choices that deny self-interest in favour of the wider group.87 
Although altruism is commendable, in reality the majority would not consistently make 
this kind of calculation, indeed it would be challenging to do so.88 We can see that this 
type of utilitarian approach might mean that the most vulnerable make do with less. 
This approach is at odds with the original ethos of the welfare state, which was to 
provide support for those in need and was viewed as part of broader societal 
responsibility.89  
 
                                                          
83 Discussed in more depth in Chapter Two.  
84 The increased marketization of care is discussed further in the following chapter.  
85 Picciotto, S., ‘The Internationalisation of the State’ Capital and Class [1991] Vol.15, No.1 43-63.  
86 West (n24) 27. 
87 Rosen (n26) 292. 
88 Ibid 292. 
89 Sir William Beveridge Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/19_07_05_beveridge.pdf  Accessed January 26th 2016. 
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The utilitarian system can lead to a culture of individual responsibility and blame when 
people appear to fail to engage in accepted behaviours.90 ‘Failure’ can take many 
forms, including illness, homeless and unemployment. Frederick Rosen argues that 
classic utilitarians would not support a state based on such an unequivocal maxim.91 
He means that utilitarians would be loath to accept such a black and white ideal. The 
doctrine of not causing harm to other members of society does not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that individuals should behave in a manner which will enhance the 
happiness of others.92 The ethical burden on individuals to consistently behave in a 
way which increases the happiness of others is onerous.93 It begs the question 
whether we can know what will bring about happiness in others and how we might 
begin to evaluate what others might consider valuable.94 Living life according to ethical 
standards might be viewed as something which is not contentious but that is based on 
assumptions that people share similar values.  
 
Rosen argues that where classic utilitarians focused on society as a homogenous 
group, law is developed narrowly, aimed at particular, identified sections.95 He further 
argues that only behaviour which is considered to be a detrimental “social 
manifestation” is recognised.96 If he is correct, then the idea that only rule breaking 
behaviour in the public arena is important is established. Rosen’s arguments support 
my claim that actions in the public sphere are prioritised over those that occur in 
private, including care. The utilitarian approach has led to the public arena being 
                                                          
90 Discussed in the following chapter. 
91 Rosen (n26) 292.  
92 Ibid 293. 
93 Rosen (n26) 292.  
94 Ibid 292. 
95 Rosen (n26) 293. 
96 Ibid 293. 
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regarded as more important, leading to tensions in the welfare state, particularly in 
relation to stretched resources. Nonetheless, the welfare state has grown rapidly in 
the last few decades, partly as a result of economic crises in the 1990s and 2008.97 At 
the same time more people have become dependent on the welfare state, 
bureaucracy has increased accordingly.98 Utilitarianism has been a driving force 
behind this expansion, rationing resources and encouraging local authorities to 
prioritise individual needs respectively.  
 
Although there has been much discussion in recent years about difficulties caused by 
governments imposing austerity measures, austerity is not a new phenomenon. 
During the period Mill was writing, the Poor Laws were operating. These laws 
established workhouses where those needing support could go.99 The poor had been 
stigmatised as lazy and being supported by the tax payer. As an alternative they were 
admitted into workhouses where conditions were harsh, separating families and 
working hours were long.100 The workhouses were widely criticised, including by 
political campaigner Richard Oastler who labelled them “Prisons for the Poor”.101In the 
1930s, Ramsey McDonald’s cabinet was faced with a country moving away from 
nineteenth century Poor Laws while being faced with a significant economic deficit.102 
Even the introduction of the welfare state in the UK in the 1940s occurred at a time 
when post war rationing was in force.103    
 
                                                          
97 Kuhnle, S., The Survival of the European Welfare State (Routledge 2000) 3, 4.  
98 Carr (n1) 209.  
99 The Settlement Act was not repealed until 1948 and some sections of the Poor Law Act 1601 until 
1967.  
100 Longmate, N., The Workhouse: A Social History (Pimlico 2003) 13, 14.  
101 The Victorian Web www.victorianweb.org/history/poorlaw/oastler.html  
102 Farnsworth, K., and Irving, Z., Social Policy in Times of Austerity – Global Economic Crisis and the 
new politics of welfare (Policy Press 2015) 46-49.  
103 Rationing ended in 1953.  
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A prominent utilitarian with strong views on bureaucracy was Sidney Webb, a key 
thinker in the formation of the welfare state. He argued societies would be ideally 
based on notions of social duty and co-operation.104 Webb believed those in positions 
of advantage should live frugally in order to support those who had less.105 He viewed 
capitalism as inadequate in terms of addressing increases in production, arguing poor 
people would gain more happiness from less money than the rich.106 Webb considered 
that capitalism was even more deficient in relation to improving welfare.107 He 
considered that founders of social policy, who he saw as an elite, would prosper in 
increasingly bureaucratic systems. Bevir argues that progressive liberals see the 
welfare state as founded in utilitarian liberal principles born from open-minded ideas 
about reform of social frameworks.108 On Webb’s analysis, he claimed a specific group 
of bureaucrats were directing policies which were incapable of appropriately 
addressing welfare problems and increasingly overlooking individuals. He was 
suggesting bureaucrats were not aware of individuals’ real needs.  
 
Carr has argued that in fact, law has been instrumental in the rising levels of 
bureaucracy between care recipients and the state since the end of the Poor Laws.109 
There has been increased regulation in service provision and the National Health 
Service and Community Care Act 1990 changed local authority roles in care services 
while marketization expanded.110 Initially, local authorities commissioned services but 
shifts in legislation have meant that care recipients have been progressively 
                                                          
104 Webb, S., Utilitarianism, Positivism, and Social Democracy peer reviewed by Bevir, M., Journal of 
Modern History [2002] 74 217-252, 5.  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-
bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/343407&erFrom=6468057476852114189Guest 
105 Ibid 17. 
106 Webb (n105) 22. 
107 Ibid 22. 
108 Bevir, M., The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge University Press 1999).  
109 Carr (n1) 209. 
110 Ibid 210.  
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encouraged to buy services themselves.111 As a result, there has been a growth in 
numbers of private care agencies.112 Stoesz sees this increase in marketisation as a 
product of bureaucrats guiding limited resources to profit making sections of society.113 
Criticism has suggested this change provides evidence the welfare state is being 
incrementally dismantled.114 I am not suggesting that all bureaucracies lead to 
marketisation and focus on economy, I simply seek to establish this in connection with 
western democracies.115 Stoesz states that bureaucrats have increasingly cultivated 
the welfare state according to rationality, efficiency and costs.116 However Kuhnle 
notes that European welfare states grew significantly between the 1960s and 
1980s.117 Cuts in public spending increased in the 1990s, following significant 
decreases in the number of people employed in the public sector under Margaret 
Thatcher in the 1980s.118 Church bureaucracy pre utilitarianism has been exchanged 
for welfare bureaucracy as a result of the welfare state’s connection with resources. 
There has been criticism by politicians of the “bureaucratic, inefficient and costly 
welfare state”.119 Therefore the state’s role in welfare provision has not always been 
seen as positive and individuals have been overlooked while bureaucracy has 
thrived.120 Instead, those with needs are steered towards their families and voluntary 
organisations.121  
 
                                                          
111 Through the Community Care (Direct Payments) Act 1996.  
112 Pavolini, E., and Ranci, C., ‘Restructuring the welfare state: reforms in long-term care in Western 
European countries’ Journal of European Social Policy [2008] Vol.18, No. 3, 246-259, 247. 
113 Stoesz, D., ‘A Wake for the Welfare State: Social Welfare and the Neoconservative Challenge’ 
Social Service Review [1981] 55.3 398-411.  
114 Stoesz (n113) 400.  
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Complementary to this argument, bureaucrats generally favour frameworks of welfare 
based on regulations and procedures which those outside the system find challenging 
to comprehend.122 As a result, this makes decisions made by local authorities difficult 
to challenge.123 Stoesz argues that a move away from bureaucracy to market driven 
services would give service users more opportunities to choose providers and 
competition would drive down costs.124 I view this as problematic as it suggests service 
users would have a free rein and the ability to compare providers, conferring potentially 
unwanted responsibility on service users to contract with providers. Stoesz recognises 
that while bureaucratic power might be limited by market expansion, broader problems 
in society will not be effectively addressed.125  
 
A further critique of overly bureaucratic systems is their purpose to achieve specified 
objectives.126 As a result it is possible that the aim of bureaucrats will be significantly 
different from those subject to their decisions. We can see this contention in social 
care case law, particularly in McDonald and Savva.127 In both cases, resources were 
limiting care packages for each service user. Prendergast identifies a key problem with 
bureaucracy, noting it is assumed to be effective and appropriate until someone makes 
a complaint.128 If we accept utilitarianism as a consequentialist approach, we can view 
the eventual complaint as an example of an inability to foresee consequences. Having 
                                                          
122 Stoesz (n113) 402. 
123 Ibid 402. Stoesz warns against monopolies in care, either in respect of professionals or service 
providers.   
124 Stoesz (n113) 403-404. 
125 Ibid 404.  
126 Prendergast, C. ‘The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats’ The American Economic Review [2007] 
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considered dilemmas caused by bureaucracy in relation to social care, I now explore 
some general critiques of utilitarianism.  
 
4. Critiques of Utilitarianism 
 
As established earlier, utilitarianism is based on ideas of promoting happiness 
maximisation. However defining happiness is problematic. I noted that even among 
utilitarian thinkers there are critical differences, particularly between Bentham and 
Mill.129 Nonetheless, the utilitarian approach to happiness is a key problem as it treats 
people as homogenous, overlooking those with different priorities or needs. If certain 
individual’s needs are being sacrificed as a result, we need to actively recognise and 
acknowledge that before it can be challenged. Undoubtedly this approach highlights 
obvious differences between objective and subjective happiness.130 Rosen has 
argued that utilitarians placed greater value on objective theories as opposed to the 
subjectivity of their opponents.131 He sees this as problematic because most people 
do not experience pain and pleasure in an objective, rational manner.132   
 
Rosen’s view stands in contention to Mill. Mill believed that our wish to be a unified 
society meant that an individual’s social identification would be so logical that he could 
not see himself as anything other than part of a group.133 Mill argued that society could 
only function successfully if the interests of all were to be equally respected.134 His 
view can be critiqued because utilitarianism, as a consequentialist approach, focuses 
                                                          
129 West (n24) 120. 
130 Ibid 106. 
131 Rosen (n26) 288. 
132 Ibid 288. 
133 Unfortunately utilitarianism has always favoured adult males.  
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on outcomes without trying to estimate what they could be in advance.135 Thus, actions 
will be approved if the consequences they have are viewed as good or positive.136 As 
a result of the failure to anticipate poor outcomes, policies are put in place which may 
have detrimental effects on some people. As a policy basis, by the time flaws and 
problems are recognised, they have already had a substantial negative impact. For 
the purposes of this work, a particularly strong criticism of utilitarianism is that if favours 
particular groups of people over others. 
 
4(i). Utilitarianism and gender 
 
Another critique of Mill’s utilitarianism is its basis on “competent agents” who were 
educated, adult males.137 During Mill’s lifetime (1806-73) comparatively few females 
were in education in the same way as males. Nonetheless Mill himself was a keen 
campaigner for women, supporting suffrage. His work in this area could be said to 
present an objection to socially accepted structures based on class, gender and social 
expectations.138 In contrast, Valerie Bryson argues that utilitarianism is male biased 
and foundations of masculine norms mean women’s experiences have been pushed 
to the boundaries of legal considerations.139 
 
There has been an emphasis placed on male ideas in which there has been little or 
no place for women. The gendered male view is based on ideas of individualism and 
rights based considerations as opposed to that of responsibility.140 Mill’s utilitarianism 
                                                          
135 West (n24) 117. 
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137 West (n24) 120, 128-129.  
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can be seen to support the notion that women are inferior to men in thought and 
intellect.141 He believed women were not sufficiently mature to develop reasoning in 
the same way as men. Bryson cites feminist activism since the 1960s as having gained 
significant changes for women.142 She notes these changes have not been shared by 
all women and that experiences of many black and working class white women have 
been rendered invisible.143 Advancement for women has not been consistent and we 
need clearer understandings of ways in which women have been subordinated before 
true equality can be achieved.144 The majority of liberal theorists, including Mill, did not 
believe that rights held by men could be provided to women. Bryson notes these 
theorists felt that in order to be treated as equal to men, women would have to “speak 
like men”.145  
 
Feminists oppose this approach, arguing that any supposed inferiority was due to 
societal structures rather than as a result of gender.146 Liberalism places weight on 
male values of rationality, independence and disembodied individuals.147  
Understandings based on male bias therefore ignore values traditionally associated 
with women and overlooks work done by women in the private arena. Judicial 
approaches founded upon male bias continue to inform law and operate adversely in 
connection with women’s interests. Law has historically been influenced by men in the 
utilitarian state and continues today.148 As a result, Bryson argues this leads to 
restricted viewpoints on the part of judges, overlooking lived experiences of women. 
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These arguments are supported by figures from the Centre for Advancement of 
Women in Politics.149 Their statistics show that in 2013 comparatively few judges were 
female. Bryson sees this as problematic because their backgrounds and experiences 
may contribute to increased marginalisation of women.150 She argues that individuals 
who are “socially and economically disadvantaged” will particularly bear the brunt of 
this demographic.151  
 
 
The male bias in law can be traced to a negligence case in 1933.152 Here the 
‘reasonable man’ test was established. It was intended to define a level of 
reasonableness that the ordinary man, famously on the Clapham omnibus, might 
concur with. There was no question at the time what the reasonable person, never 
mind the reasonable woman might think. Therefore this suggests male bias is implicit 
in the notion of the objective standard. The argument that law is built upon male bias 
is supported by Joanne Conaghan who states that in the past, women have been 
prevented from taking an active part in jurisprudence.153 Gender tends to be 
consistently overlooked unless the case specifically concerns it and can be seen in 
relation to same-sex marriage.154 Conaghan contends that this is significant because 
ideally law should reflect “social reality” and in practice fails to do so.155 Instead law is 
not only representative of “social arrangements” but plays a key role in establishing 
and reinforcing norms.156 Conaghan argues that feminist legal theory has not made 
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significant impacts in the analysis of Judges yet.157 Nonetheless, Roger Cotterell 
argues feminism has made considerable inroads into targeted areas including 
employment and criminal law.158 Furthermore, feminists have focused on particular 
areas connected with women where differences with men are actively recognised.159 
 
In acknowledgement of the male bias evident in much case law, Cotterell adds that 
law has reflected the “blindness” of the social seen in normative legal theory.160 He 
states this is a problem because it evaluates women against the acknowledged 
standards of men.161 Utilitarianism is responsible for setting a male-based standard 
that has become established as normal. Arguments that gender differences are 
socially constructed has long been a feminist claim.162 Basing values on masculine 
norms, patriarchy is reinforced perniciously and women are pushed further out in legal 
consideration.163 Supporting my argument that utilitarianism was the foundation for 
preference towards males, Cotterell advocates a look back at historical and social 
influences to see how this developed.164 In relation to the utilitarian state, we can see 
that normative foundations presented have been consistently male.  
 
The view of men as rights bearers has led to law based on winners and losers in 
Cotterell’s view. He questions whether law could be altered so that is no longer 
focused on that premise.165 He would prefer to see judges trying to find a more 
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“inclusive” solution.166 Cotterell’s argument is valuable to this work because he 
believes feminism has the ability to confront ideas about norms in law.167 He contends 
feminism can play a critical role in moving away from notions based on rights.168 In 
arguing that feminism is better positioned to recognise nuances in legal practice, 
Cotterell sees it as insisting that feminist theory is recognised in legal discourse.169 He 
states that if feminist legal theory continues to be overlooked, law is illustrating its 
present inadequacy in terms of analysis.170  
 
5. Judicial thinking in the utilitarian state 
 
Much research on judicial thinking focuses on the criminal sphere, so in order to 
illustrate my argument I have focused on a social care case and explain why I believe 
male bias is prominent. In a paper based on criminal law and sentencing, Cassia 
Spohn considers that utilitarian judges focus on outcomes.171 Evaluating how social 
care might be affected by utilitarian values of maximisation of benefits, Raphael 
Cohen-Almagor argues constrained financial issues focus on whom is deemed worthy 
to receive state resources.172 He notes that significant attention is paid to what ideal 
situations would be and real pressures caused by financial restraints. Cohen-Almagor 
recognises that distribution of tight resources has to be seen as equitable and find 
balance between individual and society’s greater needs.173   
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172 Cohen-Almagor, R.D., ‘A Critique of Callahan’s Utilitarian Approach to Resource Allocation in 
Health Care Issues’ Law and Medicine [2012] Vol.17, No 3 (Spring) 1-25   
www.hull.ac.uk/rca/docs/articles/allocation-resources.pdf   
173 Cohen-Almagor (n172) 5. 
Laura Wares ʹ LLM by Research 
 
33 
 
 
The utilitarian state’s approach has been exacerbated by people living longer with 
increasingly complex needs.174 As Cohen-Almagor acknowledges, budgets have not 
risen accordingly and this has led to older people being sacrificed.175 He states that 
utilitarian preference for those who contribute economically to society is an example 
of “gross utilitarianism” and overlooks moral considerations concerning those 
deserving care.176 We see a utilitarian approach placing heavy emphasis on allocation 
of resources in McDonald.177    
 
In McDonald, a woman with a neurogenic bladder and mobility difficulties was faced 
with losing her night -time carer who enabled her to use the toilet, because of financial 
restrictions. Lord Brown (giving the leading judgment) expressed sympathy for Ms 
McDonald but simultaneously highlighted savings of £22,000 to the local authority if 
the carer was replaced by incontinence pads.178 Lord Brown’s next consideration of 
resources occurs in paragraph 9, relying on the decision in Barry which established a 
local authority’s right to consider resources in social care decisions.179 The emphasis 
on available finances indicate a strong utilitarian impulse to place society’s concerns 
before individual needs. It connects firmly with Cohen-Almagor’s argument about 
sacrificing individuals because of general interests. Spohn’s view of utilitarian judges 
focusing on outcomes is illustrated by Brown LJ’s statement in reference to FACS 
guidance180: “Councils should ensure that…within a council area, individuals in similar 
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circumstances receive services capable of achieving broadly similar outcomes”. 181 
Nonetheless, Brown LJ did note extensive paperwork which reflected Ms McDonald’s 
considerable distress at the proposed course of action.182 
 
In relation to Ms McDonald’s claim under s21 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
Brown LJ dismissed Counsel’s argument, considering the local authority’s actions to 
be “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.183 Instead of being a breach 
of statutory duty as McDonald was arguing, the local authority was fulfilling its duty 
and she would benefit as a result.184 The suggestion was that Ms McDonald would 
remain safe in bed, avoiding increased risk of moving from her bed at night, while the 
local authority could save money and meet its duty. In reaching this conclusion, it 
appears Brown LJ was placing weight on both the outcome of his decision – Ms 
McDonald being able to urinate without leaving her bed - and resources regarding the 
savings for the local authority. Brown LJ’s judgment was supported by the majority 
judges, Lady Hale dissenting.    
 
Lord Dyson returned to the discussion of resources citing the local authority Service 
Manager.185 Dyson LJ noted Ms McDonald had first been made aware of resource 
implications in 2007. The local authority had agreed to fund night time care at that 
stage on a short term basis. The suggestion was that the local authority was willing to 
meet Ms McDonald halfway but there was never intention for this to last indefinitely. 
Dyson LJ states that repeated reassessments were conducted, maintaining the local 
                                                          
181 (n3) [9] (Brown LJ).  
182 (n3) [11-12] (Brown LJ).  
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authority position that it could not afford permanent night carers.186 Emphasis on 
resources in the face of Ms McDonald’s need arguments took precedence throughout 
judicial discussion. Ms McDonald’s needs had not changed during the time period 
despite being reinterpreted by the local authority since 2007.187 Yet this 
reinterpretation of need occurred specifically as a means to justify reducing her care 
costs.  
 
The majority judges’ approach in McDonald is utilitarian. In a utilitarian state, spending 
less money on individuals means that ‘extra’ money can be redistributed. In this case 
I believe, in connection with arguments presented by both Spohn and Cohen-Almagor, 
that outcomes and resources led majority judicial thinking. It is arguable that in fact, 
the outcome in McDonald was intended to address some needs but not in the way the 
individual wanted. Furthermore the way in which needs were met was influenced by 
constrained resources and resulted in the individual’s wishes being overlooked. It is 
my contention that in social care cases, utilitarianism is inappropriate.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that utilitarian theory has influenced liberal state policy. This 
approach was considered progressive in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
because it offered a system based on maximisation of the happiness of the majority. 
However, I argue that today utilitarianism fails to adequately consider the needs of 
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individuals and this is problematic in care. Utilitarianism led to development of blanket 
policies which do not recognise nuances associated with care practice.  
 
The construction of the paradigm liberal individual is built upon Mill’s idea of male, 
conscientious actors. Liberal subjects are expected to be active in the workforce and 
individually responsible. Model citizens operate in the public sphere while activity in 
the private is overlooked. Accordingly this subject is disembodied in the sense that his 
value is connected to economic productivity, rather than biological reality. 
Utilitarianism is further critiqued as a static approach which restricts discourse. In 
areas like care, which are by nature diverse and fluctuating, a static approach is 
problematic because it is not sufficiently attentive to change. Discussion should be 
open, flexible and acknowledge the situations of those involved in care.  
 
Significantly, utilitarianism is based on normative male standards meaning the 
interests of women are consistently neglected. I have touched on how feminism can 
challenge utilitarian frameworks and the way feminist arguments have identified how 
certain aspects of women’s lives have changed in recent decades. There has been a 
utilitarian view that women need to aspire to male structural expectations. Anyone who 
cannot meet the accepted standard of the paradigm individual is seen to be inferior 
and problematic. Therefore anyone who operates significantly in private arenas are 
overlooked. Conaghan argues that gender is ignored unless it is a key component of 
the case. Cotterell claims that feminism can present an effective challenge to male 
bias, standards and expectations. 
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The utilitarian, male based approach extends to jurisprudence. I have identified a case 
where I believe there has been a focus on utilitarian values of resources and 
outcomes. In McDonald, judicial rationality was applied to both factors allowing the 
individual’s wishes to be overlooked. Here the outcome was twofold – to save the local 
authority money while meeting individual need to an extent. In finding the local 
authority’s stance to be satisfactory, the judgment reinforced the idea that social care 
can be led by budgetary considerations. In the next chapter I argue that feminism has 
the potential to prove a more progressive and appropriate approach to meet the 
challenges of social care.  
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Chapter Two – Feminism as an alternative to utilitarianism 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In my last chapter I demonstrated that the utilitarian, male-based approach which has 
influenced judicial thinking has been ineffective in responding to predicaments in social 
welfare, particularly those within the field of adult social care.  In this chapter, I suggest 
that feminist theory can present a more progressive approach in re-evaluating care 
and policy frameworks. My argument develops the previous chapter by presenting 
feminism as both a critique of and an alternative to utilitarianism. Utilitarianism’s focus 
on aggregate maximisation of pleasure fails to recognise individual needs and human 
embodiment discussed in chapter one.  
 
I begin by arguing that adult social care is a feminist issue because women continue 
to be disproportionately affected by caring responsibilities, through both structural 
expectations of women and differential health outcomes. In considering the meaning 
of care, I move beyond the dictionary definition, which describes it as providing what 
is required to maintain health and welfare, since I regard care as relational.188 Care 
can occur informally, between family and friends or through paid carers providing a 
service. There has been considerable work on relationality and care, including the 
ethics of care and vulnerability theories which will be discussed below. 
 
The first section of this chapter presents my claim that care is a feminist issue. I argue 
that although expectations of women in the workforce have changed, they have not 
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altered significantly with regards to care provision.189 I discuss the importance of 
responsibility for care, its impact on ageing women and its contribution to the adverse 
health they suffer. Poor health in older women has been attributed in significant part 
to their caring responsibilities.190  
 
I identify two feminist frameworks for examining the state’s approach to care, the ethics 
of care and vulnerability theory, which I supplement with other feminist literature.  I 
consider the ethics of care as developed by Gilligan, which has become prominent in 
care literature.191 I use Gilligan’s work to highlight how areas traditionally connected 
with women constantly fail to be acknowledged appropriately in male-dominated 
discourse. I then evaluate how women are increasingly pushed from the workforce 
towards informal care because of shortages in resources. I examine how care is often 
assumed to be a private concern as opposed to a public one. The consequence of this 
assumption is that care is ignored in wider public debate unless something goes 
wrong. I support my ethics of care argument by considering the views of Berenice 
Fisher and Joan Tronto who argue that the role of men in care is often overlooked, 
which reinforces the assumption that men cannot care. Instead they argue, as do I, 
that men should be enabled to care.192  
 
                                                          
189 Cooper, R., Low-paid Care Work, Bargaining, and Employee Voice in Australia, Chapter 3 in Bogg, 
A. and Novitz, T (eds) Voices at Work (Harvard University Press 2014). 
190 DiGiacomo, M., Davidson, P.M., Zecchin, R., Lamb, K and Daly, J., ‘Caring for Others, but Not 
Themselves: Implications for Health Care Interventions in Women with Cardiovascular Disease’ 
Nursing Research and Practice, [2011] Volume 2011, Article ID 376020. 
www.hindawi.com/journals/nrp/2011/376020/    Accessed November 7th 2015.  
191 Gilligan (n4).  
192 Fisher, B. and Tronto, J., Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring in Circles of Care: Work and Identity 
in Women’s Lives, Abel, E.K, and Nelson, M.K., (eds) (State University of New York Press 1990) 36. 
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Following the ethics of care, I draw on work by Bacchi to illustrate how policy 
consistently reinforces problematic expectations of gender.193 I focus on Bacchi’s 
discussion of how the Netherlands has made a concerted effort to reconsider structural 
expectations in order to change attitudes to care. The Dutch approach involves moving 
away from established male norms and blanket policies which formed the basis of the 
utilitarian system. As an alternative, I evaluate how Beasley and Bacchi’s work on 
“Social Flesh” could lead to better understandings of embodiment.194 Their work 
identifies the need for understanding interdependence and a universal approach to 
care. I explore some critiques of the ethics of care, particularly arguments which 
concern women’s perceptions of their role in society.195 
 
In the chapter’s final section I consider vulnerability theory as advanced by 
Fineman.196 Fineman advocates acknowledgement of universal vulnerability in order 
to transform care. She argues that once vulnerability has been recognised, we must 
develop resilience.197 Resilience involves creating resources on which individuals can 
rely at times of greater need. Fineman discusses resilience in connection with 
dependency. She acknowledges dependency will change throughout our lives, 
arguing that wider debate involving the state should be encouraged to push care 
forward as a universal concern. Dependency can be defined as something all humans 
share to varying degrees throughout life. In turn, it depends on having a level of 
                                                          
193 Bacchi, C., Mainstreaming Politics Gendering Practices and Feminist Theory (Cambridge 
University Press 2012).    
194 Beasley, C. and Bacchi, C., ‘Envisaging a new politics for an ethical future: Beyond trust, care and 
generosity – towards an ethic of ‘social flesh’ [2007] Feminist Theory, December, Vol. 8, 3:279-298. 
Embodiment means recognition that both men and women are inherently biological. Previous thinking 
has associated men with the mind and women as entrapped by biological functions.  
195 Touching on arguments which move away from the essentialist basis which Gilligan’s work has 
been critiqued as.  
196 Fineman and Grear (n5).  
197 Ibid 22.  
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reliance, trust and confidence, in someone else. Dependency is viewed by Fineman 
as being either inevitable or derivative and both “developmental and biological in 
nature”.198  Fineman extends the discussion of dependency by recognising that it is 
not limited to humans and emphasises that institutions and the state can be vulnerable 
too.199 Realisation of this vulnerability is critical to open discourse and reflects how the 
state can be responsive to citizens’ needs.  
 
The role of the state is discussed according to Fineman’s vision of developing a 
responsive state and active citizens. The responsive state involves enabling citizens 
to draw attention to their concerns, particularly those concerns that, like care, are 
considered to be private. A responsive state enhances the ability of its citizens to 
develop resilience and act as a support in times of crisis. These arguments lead me 
to discuss the needs of specific groups of people. I evaluate Fineman’s arguments 
surrounding groups who are deemed vulnerable based on a few shared 
characteristics. She contends that the current system places importance on 
responsibility and those that do not conform are viewed as having failed.200 As an 
example of a vulnerable population, I consider the example of individuals subject to 
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs).  A focus on this group is appropriate because 
it tends to be made up of vulnerable people subject to different care needs and they 
are subject to increased regulation and surveillance.201 Fineman argues that perceived 
                                                          
198 Fineman (n5) 18.  
199 Ibid 25-26. 
200 Other academics have also pointed out that contemporary citizens have increasingly been 
responsibilized. See Clarke, J., ‘New Labour’s citizens: activated, empowered, responsibilized, 
abandoned?’ Critical Social Policy [2005] vol.25, no.4, 447-463 and Levitas, R., ‘There may be 
‘trouble’ ahead: what we know about those 120,000 ‘troubled’ families’ PSE UK Policy Working Paper  
[2012] No.3 (February) http://www.poverty.ac.uk/policy-response-working-paper-families-social-
justice-life-chances-children-parenting-uk-government   Accessed February 2nd 2016.    
201 Surveillance will be discussed in later chapters. 
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failure results from negative perceptions of these groups and could be avoided if a 
universal and supportive approach was adopted.  
 
 Finally I examine criticisms of Fineman’s theory, specifically from the viewpoint of 
women of colour. Kimberle Crenshaw claims that many feminist theories fail to 
adequately consider the position of women of colour.202 This criticism is shared by 
Gayatri Spivak, who states that often women’s voices will only be considered if they 
conform to Western dialogues.203. Crenshaw and Spivak’s criticisms highlight the need 
for groups whose interests are not appropriately addressed to be explicitly considered. 
However, Fineman argues against using identity characteristics such as race in 
relation to equality arguments because it can place identified groups in contention with 
each other and could result in individuals who are not connected to a group being 
ignored.204. Although Fineman recognises that it would be inappropriate to overlook 
the issues faced by women of colour, overlooking the significance of identity 
characteristics could operate as a limitation to the effectiveness of the theory if those 
women feel excluded from its discussions.205  
 
2. Why care is a feminist issue 
 
In the first chapter I discussed the evolution of utilitarianism in the United Kingdom. I 
acknowledged that it presented an opportunity to move away from the previous strict 
                                                          
202 Crenshaw (n8) 195-217.    
203 Spivak, G.C., Can the Subaltern Speak? 271-313 in Lloyd, D., Representation’s Coup 
Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies [2014] Vol. 16, Issue 1 Taylor and Francis 
1-29 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2012.726444 
204 Fineman (n5) 15. 
205 Ibid 15 – see her footnote.  
Laura Wares ʹ LLM by Research 
 
43 
 
teachings of the Church and as such it was a progressive step in creating a liberal 
state. However I identified flaws, particularly its tendency to adopt policies in favour of 
the majority, overlooking needs of individuals. In addition I recognised that 
utilitarianism limited its focus to economically productive adult males, thereby failing 
to address issues affecting most of the population. I argue that this approach has had 
a significant effect on the lives of women in relation to expectations.  
 
The modern liberal state has increasingly placed importance on women being actively 
engaged in the paid workforce, which has coincided with a growth in feminism and 
women seeking work outside the home.206 Nevertheless women’s transition into the 
paid workforce has not taken place in accordance with a reduction in domestic 
responsibilities.207 Women have taken on extra responsibilities associated with paid 
work, but the role of men with regard to domestic and care labour has not shifted in 
the same way.208 Although more men are now engaged in care, particularly in the over 
65 age group, women are still expected to carry the primary obligations of family 
needs.209 The increased obligations associated with paid work on top of caring 
responsibilities has led to what Martha Nussbaum described as a “double day” – 
women come home to traditional duties of care after days at work.210   
 
                                                          
206 Lewis, J., Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes, Journal of European Social Policy 
[1992] Vol 2, No. 3 (August) 159-173. 
207 Ibid 161.  
208 Lewis (206) 162. 
209 NHS News www.nhs.uk/news/2013/05May/Pages/numbers-unpaid-carers-young-carers-
increase.apsx  Accessed June 6th 2015. This changes in the over 65 age group where more men than 
women provide care.  
210 Nussbaum, M.C., Creating Capabilities, The Human Development Approach (Harvard University 
Press 2013) 37. 
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The double commitment resulting from dual roles in paid and unpaid work is 
problematic from a feminist viewpoint because women are often undervalued in the 
paid workplace. Lydia Hayes states that gender has a pervasive influence in paid and 
unpaid work simply because women can find it difficult to be heard at work.211 She 
argues that although the Equal Pay Act 1970 intended to ensure men and women 
were paid appropriately, the Act did not apply to all women in the workforce.212 The 
system works by comparing women’s pay to that of men who were employed in the 
same kind of work. In care, where workers were predominantly female, there were not 
the same opportunities to raise pay.213 As a result many women who are highly skilled 
and experienced remain undervalued and poorly paid, simply because they do not 
work in a suitably comparable environment.214 So while the Equal Pay Act did help 
some women, not all women’s work was re-evaluated.215  
 
Cooper suggests that care workers (particularly those in residential homes or who 
undertake home visits) who remain undervalued are not only vulnerable but also 
‘silent’.216 If Cooper is correct, this is problematic because it suggests that care 
workers lack the means to convey dissatisfaction about the way they are valued and I 
consider that we must acknowledge care workers’ agency. The problem is significant 
when we consider that 82% of people employed in caring services are female.217 
Among female graduates, 27% work in jobs such as care, teaching assistants or in 
                                                          
211 Hayes, L., ‘Women’s Voice’ and equal pay in Bogg, A. and Novitz, T (eds) Voices at Work 
(Harvard University Press 2014)35.   
212 This Act has now been repealed by the Equality Act 2010.  
213 Hayes (n211) 38.  
214 Ibid 40. 
215 Hayes (n21) 40.  
216 Cooper (n189) 55.  
217 Full Report – Women in the labour market, Office of National Statistics (25th September 2013) 11. 
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_328352.pdf   Accessed November 13th 2015. The most common 
occupation for women was women was nursing but caring occupations are not defined further than 
that.  
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administrative roles (compared to 13% of men).218 Furthermore, female graduates are 
more likely to be employed in lower skilled jobs than their male counterparts. 219 Those 
figures reinforce the idea that care needs to be made more attractive as a job to men. 
There has been acknowledgement that more men need to be recruited into the caring 
profession.220 
 
However there are potential problems with attracting men into employment with 
significant problems with underpayment and high proportions of zero hour contracts.221 
Cooper points out that lack of stability combined with limited opportunities for training 
and career development results in carers being restricted to low-paid employment 
throughout life.222 Cooper identifies various feminist scholars as linking this 
feminisation of care with unpaid work carried out in the private domain by female family 
members. She especially emphasises Meagher who says that “Because their skills 
are “naturalised” as feminine attributes typically exercised in the public domain, care 
workers, the vast majority of whom are female, receive lower pay than their skills and 
task warrant”.223 Meagher’s view links to feminist arguments in the ethics of care which 
I discuss later.  
 
Another concern in relation to care is the effect of being a carer on women’s health. 
DiGiacomo et al identified that women are doubly likely to assume care responsibilities 
for children, older relatives and the physically ill than men.224 They claim, as 
                                                          
218 Full Report – Women in the Labour Market (n217) 15.  
219 Ibid 14, 15.  
220 Jane Ashcroft ‘Social care employers need to recruit more men’ The Guardian (March 4th 2014). 
http://www.theguardian.com/social-care-network/2014/mar/04/social-care-employers-recruit-more-
men 
221 Hayes (n211) 1, 2. 
222 Cooper (n189) 57.  
223 Meagher, G., ‘What Can We Expect From Paid Carers?’ Politics and Society [2006] 37(1) 33.  
224 DiGiacomo at el (n190) 11, 12.  
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Nussbaum did, that this is usually in addition to employment obligations.225 In an article 
based on cardio-vascular problems in older women, they discuss long term effects on 
older women’s health. They argue that care roles, often seen as positive, are in fact 
compromised by social and economic issues. As a result, women find it difficult to 
attend to their own health needs and can make them more likely to be ill as they grow 
older.226  
 
DiGiacomo et al argue that the resources required by the demanding roles undertaken 
by women are increased with each one.227 They cite work by Edwards et al which 
highlights that caregivers have recorded significantly higher levels of stress and 
depression than those that do not provide care.228 Cummins et al have also recognised 
this factor.229 Age UK have shown that life expectancy for both genders is increasing 
(for women in the UK it is 83 and 79.3 for men).230  As a result, the responsibility for 
care is likely, as the older population grows larger, to fall on a relatively small number 
of women. In a feminist context these statistics are problematic because they reinforce 
ideas about care obligations in relation to women.231 The above illustrates how women 
are especially disadvantaged by care in different contexts. Despite the significant 
amount of women involved in and affected by demands of care, the voices of women 
are not being heard effectively in discussions about care. The value of recognising 
                                                          
225 DiGiacomo et al (n190) 11, 12.  
226 Ibid 12.  
227 DiGiacomo et al (n190) 12.  
228 Edwards, B., Higgins, D., Gray, M., Zmijewski, N. and Kingston, M., ‘The nature and impact of 
caring for family members with a disability in Australia’ Australian Institute of Family Studies [2008] 
Melbourne, Australia.  
229 Cummins, R., Hughes, J., Tomyn, A., Gibson, A., Woerner, J. and Lai, L., ‘The Wellbeing of 
Australians: Carer Health and Wellbeing’ [2008] Deakin University and Australian Unity Limited, 
Melbourne, Australia.  
230 Later Life in the United Kingdom, Age UK (February 2015). www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/EN-
GB/Factsheets/Later_Life_UK_factsheet.pdf?dtrk=true  Accessed March 24th 2015. 
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women’s voices is an argument put forward by several feminist theorists in the ethics 
of care.  
 
3. The contribution of the ethics of care to feminist dialogues 
 
The ethics of care is a feminist theory which emerged in the twentieth century, which 
claims that most policies and practices overlook areas traditionally connected with 
women, such as care. Gilligan was building on foundational work of feminist writers 
including Wollstonecraft and Stanton.232 She critiqued the approaches of writers like 
Piaget and Kohlberg who viewed women as morally inferior to men.233 Gilligan viewed 
their approaches as based on masculine interests and as a result, ignored the voices 
of women. Instead her theory emphasised the importance of emotional knowledge as 
required in caring. Gilligan argued more weight should be attributed to female voices 
as opposed to the focus on male. In female dominated areas like care, this led to 
women being completely side lined.234 In developing the ethics of care, Gilligan and 
others wanted to move away from male dominated discourses.235 It was critical in 
relation to the sphere of care because of the way it impacts directly on women’s lives 
and the extent it affects them. Gilligan argued that women should not be limited to 
dialogues of care while men were concerned with ideas about rights and justice. The 
ethics of care are useful to this work because it highlights the importance and value of 
                                                          
232 Wollstonecraft’s best known work is A Vindication of the Rights of Woman with Strictures on Moral 
and Political Subjects (Joseph Johnson 1792) while Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote The Woman’s 
Bible (Reprinted by Pacific Publishing Studio 2010).  
233 See Duska, R.F., and Whelan. M., Moral Development: Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg (Paulist 
Press 1975) for an analysis of Kohlberg’s view.  
234 Abel, E.K., and Nelson, M.K., Circles of Care: Work and Identity in Women’s Lives (State 
University of New York Press 1990) 4.  
235 Noddings, N., Caring, a feminine approach to ethics and moral education (University of California 
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care to the whole of society. The ethics of care has been developed further but analysis 
is limited in this work due to constraints of space.  
 
Abel and Nelson argue that emotional work, such as care, is relegated to second place 
in comparison with “instrumental” work.236 They cite reductions in public spending and 
a growing older population as reasons why care is being pushed back towards the 
family. They argue that as we live longer, women will spend more of their lives 
providing care for older relations than for their children.237 Abel and Nelson state that 
over 70% of those providing care to older people are wives and daughters so informal 
care relies on intimate connections.238 They note that care in these situations relies on 
everyday practice as opposed to formal training and it is a fluctuating position.239 Their 
work highlights caregivers’ aptitude to adapt to different needs, often rapidly. The 
practical demand for nuanced care could be one of the reasons that so many women 
give up full-time work in order to provide care.240  
 
Fisher and Tronto have written extensively about the ethics of care, commenting that 
often care as an activity is not the focus of discussion.241 Instead they argue much 
commentary focuses on notions of men as rational and autonomous and women as 
caring. They view care as an obligation and a right as opposed to something we 
choose.242 Care is viewed as an activity so integral to everyday life that it occurs 
unconsciously. Fisher and Tronto see the practice of care as “a species activity that 
                                                          
236 Abel and Nelson (n234) 4.  
237 Ibid 4.  
238 Abel and Nelson (n234) 6.  
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includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our “world” so that we 
can live in it as well as possible”.243 They claim women do not possess a particular 
natural aptitude to care. Their view supports my argument that although men do 
engage in care, they are not enabled to in the same way as women. To achieve a 
universal approach to care which encourages and supports active practice of men, we 
must recognise phases of care and the way care operates in the marketplace and 
informally. 
 
Tronto has identified four interconnected phases of care.244 These are caring about, 
taking care of, caregiving and care receiving. Tronto views each as critical to good 
care practice but not restricted to specific relationships. Fisher and Tronto state these 
can involve individuals or groups but that each caring relationship will differ depending 
on needs.245 They identify that care is reliant on factors including “ability, time, material 
resources, knowledge and skill”.246 They argue that if care fails as a result of any of 
these factors being compromised, it will be the fault of the wider social context which 
initially generated them.247 Their argument is useful because if care is viewed as an 
informal, insular activity within the family, it will be overlooked by the state. Considering 
the significant contribution care makes to the economy, this appears to be a serious 
misjudgement.248  
 
                                                          
243 Fisher and Tronto (n192) 40.  
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Fisher and Tronto claim that the public/private divide supported by the capitalist 
economy seems to entrench gendered divisions in itself.249 They see the areas of the 
home and local community, marketplace and bureaucracy as being intertwined and 
touching care. They view women’s roles within the family as being affected by status, 
their requirement for outside resources to support care and unequal relations with men 
as limiting women’s control over their lives.250 Fisher and Tronto emphasise a need 
for common standards, enabling communities to become a source of mutual 
support.251 They compare this with the marketplace where men are expected to 
engage in waged labour. They state that if women are inclined to care within the family 
they can become isolated.252 Fisher and Tronto consider that relying on paid carers 
does not involve the same level of trust as family care.253 Providing care in the private 
sphere means women cannot always enter the marketplace as paid workers. If they 
do, they continue to be responsible for organising paid care in their absence.254 The 
marketplace is unsuited to care because it needs quick results and care is a long term 
process.255 The market also places importance on individual contractual relationships 
which may not be appropriate in care settings.256 Fisher and Tronto consider 
bureaucracy as problematic in care because of its inherent hierarchal nature.257 Care 
should be based on equal relationships, mutual trust and reciprocity promoted by the 
ethics of care. Alternatively, profit making market principles will determine what 
bureaucracies choose to care about.258 As the first chapter illustrated, this is an 
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inappropriate basis for care as it ignores the needs of individuals. It includes both 
caregivers and care recipients. I now consider some of the critiques of the ethics of 
care.  
 
3(i). Critiques of the ethics of care 
 
One of the critiques surrounding the ethics of care is the idea of having one model of 
‘woman’ at its core. Drakapoulou259 has criticised the ethic of care argument put 
forward by Gilligan in A Different Voice.260 Drakapoulou argued there is no single ideal 
woman that can be representative and gendered beliefs about what constitutes 
woman are dominated by male norms. Many feminists have argued against using 
politics of identity and move towards examining how affect can be utilised in 
challenging ingrained norms.261 Hemmings has built on Probyn’s concept of ‘feminist 
reflexivity’ by viewing it from the alternative aspect of affect.262 Hemmings argues that 
basis for change in terms of gendered expectations means that we need to understand 
there are contrasts between what is meant by ‘womanhood’ and what is meant by 
‘feminism’.263  
 
For Hemmings affect means being aware of pervading ideas in relation to gender and 
she argues this has been overlooked as a persuasive basis for change. She claims 
feminist arguments have instead been more subjective, focusing on marginality or 
                                                          
259 Drakoupoulou, M. (2009). The Ethic of Care, Female Subjectivity and Feminist Legal 
Scholarship. In Conaghan, J. ed. Feminist Legal Studies. (Routledge 2009) 199-266, 200.  
260 Although Gilligan moved away from this argument herself in her later work ‘Hearing the Difference: 
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identity.264 Hemmings’ view contrasts with the ethics of care as she sees arguments 
based on those factors as too limited to be useful.265 The ethics of care alternatively 
identifies those that fall outside accepted norms and those that have roles imposed on 
them as a result of societal structures. Hemmings advocates an approach focusing on 
emotional concepts as opposed to people.266 
 
As an alternative to grouping individuals identified as women, carers or the cared for, 
issues such as anger, dissatisfaction or need for contact should take priority.267 
Hemmings is arguing that feminist theory usually focuses on more subjective concerns 
rather than objective ones. 268  In reference to the ethics of care, this seems to be 
appropriate.  Nonetheless, the idea of viewing a section of the population as having a 
distinct set of needs instead of as a homogenous class can have advantages. We can 
see this in care because each person has individual needs and requirements which 
might need to be addressed in a more imaginative way than others. Labelling those 
with care needs in this general manner is problematic because it fails to address 
nuances which come to be understood through development of strong, understanding 
relationships.269  Nonetheless Hemmings feels that feminist solidarity can be effective 
because it recognises the ‘other’.270 The ‘other’ appears to be situated outside central 
debate, with the result that instead of being actively involved, they end up being ‘done 
to’. Feminist theory can place them in a central location where they become the 
acknowledged subject. 
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As a foundation for effective transformation in feminism, Hemmings states that 
focusing on identities leads to those identities being placed in contention with one 
another.271 As discussed in chapter one, the liberal state places value on individualism 
while pushing people to compete for restricted resources. As a result, even amongst 
marginalised groups there emerge a structure of power relationships and debates 
about whose needs should be paramount.272 Therefore weight is placed on whose 
voice can be heard the loudest. Paradoxically, this often depends on identification with 
a specific group.273 In contrast, Hemmings argues that affect should be situated 
centrally so it can present a more critical approach to the manner in which we live.274 
Furthermore she emphasises the importance of embodiment as nuanced and 
individual, arguing this should inform policy making. Instead we are defined by the 
ways we actually manage to live notwithstanding that sometimes we are making the 
best of a less than perfect situation.275  
 
Our self-perception may also differ from how we are viewed by wider society.276 
Gendered groupings have informed societal structures and expectations. Factors 
including race, religion and economic background are often overlooked and even less 
often, understood. Feminism can have a significant role to play because it 
acknowledges that people not seen as valuable are neglected in various areas. I argue 
this recognition is critical to care because feminism has the power to recognise the 
needs and pressures of those within the care system. Once the problems of care have 
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been identified, people can be considered on a more individual basis.277 Feminism is 
critical because it realises the importance of relationships in care and reciprocity.   
 
Hemmings argues that approaches like the ethics of care prioritise empathy and 
argues this is not a positive way to build on affective links between particular groups.278  
In contrast Koehn states that empathy is a critical component in care because it is a 
basic prerequisite of a caring relationship.279 Empathy allows us to consider what 
others might be experiencing and to interpret that as knowledge for ourselves. 
Although this may not always be accurate (for we can never truly know how someone 
else is feeling) it can offer us a useful insight into care practice. Empathy, to me, means 
recognising embodiment at a fundamental human level, reacting in a relational manner 
and using that to facilitate change. By recognising what is not working effectively, we 
can put ourselves in the position of others and evaluate what we can do to change 
things. Nevertheless Hemmings warns against failing to recognise the importance of 
issues including class and race in feminist discourse and what we purport to know 
about people.280 
 
Using empathy to evoke change is problematic for Hemmings because she believes 
it is accepted as being capable of solving distinctions between people.281 Instead she 
feels affect is more effective as a group incentive for change while revealing a lack of 
connection among groups of people. Hemmings is critical that feminists sometimes 
seem to accept that empathy will be welcome in reciprocal relationships like those in 
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care.282 If that is correct, it could be particularly critical in care discourse because of 
the danger of adopting a paternalistic attitude.283 As a result it could be argued that 
empathy could add to the notion of power relationships and reinforce a hierarchy in 
care situations.284 Additionally this view of empathy only appears to be seen through 
the eyes of the carer, not the cared for.285 Despite Hemmings reservations about the 
effect of empathy, care is centred on relationships and reciprocity. If a person engaged 
in providing care cannot empathise with the person they are caring for, potentially they 
will not be fully engaged in caring for that individual.  
 
Notwithstanding, Hemmings argues that to produce affective solidarity, women would 
need to be aware of the unfairness of their situation and insist on transformation of 
societal structures.286 Although this could be a persuasive argument it must be 
recognised that not all women will question these structures, let alone believe they can 
change them.287 If we accept that, it suggests that for some women, the patriarchy is 
so inherent that they do not recognise it for what it is – a means of subordination.288 
What would be useful is an argument that we need to raise the awareness of women 
in the first place. The first challenge could be based on the apparent understanding 
that women should care and so they inevitably do. We need to consider structural 
understandings and expectations associated with gender. I will now consider how 
gender might be re-evaluated in respect of the vulnerability approach.   
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4. Responding to problems of gender in care through the theory of vulnerability 
 
Although the ethics of care has made significant contributions to discussions about 
care, I argue that care would benefit from an approach that can encompass both 
genders. I move now towards considering what the difficulties are in the construction 
and perpetuation of gender roles and how they can be challenged through the 
vulnerability approach.  
 
I argue that gendered expectations are problematic in care because they reinforce 
assumptions about women. Discussions about gender differences have helped to 
continue deference in favour of male norms.  That view is supported by Bacchi who 
regards policy as generating ideas of gender and so reinforcing what it is to be male 
or female.289 She complains that pervading ideas about gender in neo-liberalism 
actually subvert the quest for equality.290 Bacchi notes that in the 1980s non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) made a clear move away from issues which 
focused on women. Instead they began to use the word ‘gender’ in an attempt to 
eradicate the marginal situation of women which was being ignored.291 Perhaps this 
suggests that gender has become used in a way which further neglects issues which 
primarily concern women. 
 
Additionally feminists have been faced with the challenge of trying to institute change 
into already existing institutions as opposed to developing new foundations.292 Bacchi 
notes the family can be considered an institution in itself and any change would have 
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to fit with societal assumptions about families.293 Furthermore this extends to 
expectations about gender roles within that framework. In considering countries which 
are making concerted efforts to challenge traditional gendered structures, she focuses 
her attention on the Netherlands. The Netherlands is engaged in building a new 
framework which has been developed with three questions in mind: “Where are the 
structurally unequal power relations between women and men to be found? How do 
they function and how are they to be evaluated?”294 In Bacchi’s view, the answers 
must be more than expecting women to readjust their behaviour and expectations to 
fit masculine norms to be effective. To enable transformation of a system built around 
norms, men will have to make alterations to their lifestyles and expectations.295 We 
need to ask ourselves questions about the way we live and how organisations operate. 
The fact that we concentrate on individuals and acting autonomously in the utilitarian 
system is a problem for care because it means that we continually fail to accept our 
dependence on people around us.  
 
In looking for new ways forward we must avoid blanket approaches which have caused 
so much harm to vulnerable people in the past and present.296 Feminists have long 
seen the law as built upon the masculine norms as developed in the utilitarian 
system.297 Conaghan argues that law overlooks biological and social facts which occur 
beyond its confines.298 In care this is problematic because of the data identified earlier, 
namely the disproportionate effect on women, through need and expectation. 
Conaghan argues that in order to change the current situation, law needs to assume 
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a broader societal approach.299 She argues this will bring gendered issues to the fore 
where they can be considered in a more candid way. 
 
As a means of transformation to gendered constructions and care, Beasley and Bacchi 
discuss the idea of ‘social flesh’.300 Theirs is a new model which is based on mutual 
reliance and “social space, infrastructure and resources”.301 They express concern 
about the neo-liberalist idea of the disembodied “atomistic” individual who functions 
autonomously in his or her own bubble.302 Beasley and Bacchi instead propose a 
system of mutual qualities in order to aid progress in future. ‘Social flesh’ is a 
recognition of embodiment and stands in contention with current neo-liberal views.303 
Their argument is for development of a system of social support which moves away 
from focusing on the supposed shortfalls of needy people. Currently the success or 
failure of the liberal state is measured on how successful (or not) its citizens are.304  
 
Beasley and Bacchi express a desire to progress beyond the limitations of care ethics 
to neo-liberalism. They argue that emphasis should be placed on the “embodied co-
existence” which has a socio-political aspect.305 ‘Social flesh’ invokes a clear 
acknowledgement of interdependence amongst people. It moves away from the 
disparity of the neo-liberal state which distinguishes between active, strong citizens 
and those seen as weak and with needs. ‘Social flesh’ is intended to incorporate all 
individuals, not just those deemed vulnerable.306 It is intended to offer an alternative 
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to the masculine norms of the liberal state while avoiding enforcement of prescriptive 
measures. The next section discusses vulnerability theory developed by Fineman and 
the reasons I believe it could play a significant role in transforming care, including 
ideas about gender. 
 
5. The universal basis of vulnerability and the development of resilience   
 
Fineman’s theory challenges liberal individualism by suggesting that what all humans 
have in common is that we are vulnerable.307 Her emphasis on shared vulnerability 
suggests that we all need the support of others and infrastructure to permit us to live 
our lives in the way we choose. To achieve progress, Fineman argues that individuals 
must be enabled to develop a level of resilience, and she defines resilience in terms 
of mutual responsibility and acceptance of vulnerability.308 Fineman’s idea of resilience 
recognises the need for support for human beings to come from the state, institutions 
and individuals. If we fail to recognise human beings as possessing inherent 
vulnerability, it becomes harder to formulate supportive policies for times of need.  
 
Fineman is not simply arguing for the state to provide adequate resources for care. 
She would prefer the development of individual resilience. Resilience focuses on 
individuals with needs and understands that we all have different levels of resilience 
which will change throughout our lives. Resilience will depend on the resources that 
are available to us and the way we access them. In emphasising the importance of 
resilience, Fineman is asking us to reconsider what is meant by dependency.309 She 
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argues for a refined idea of dependency which should not be hidden in the confines of 
the family. She wants the state to recognise dependency as something which should 
concern it at a primary level. As a result, care for dependent relatives would become 
a wider concern and greater opportunities for open discussion about how to solve care 
problems would be cultivated.  
 
Grear, further explaining Fineman’s theory, argues there are many factors affecting 
individuals over which they have no control.310 She highlights the need to develop 
resilience to enable people to withstand difficulties when they arise. Grear also 
recognises the vulnerability of institutions, the fragility of which institutions was 
highlighted by the economic crash of 2008. She interprets the theory of vulnerability 
as persuasive because it has the potential to produce lively discourse and critiques in 
its aim to build a foundation for a social order built on equality and justice.311  
  
The arguments presented by Fineman and Grear emphasise the importance of having 
governments that actively listen to citizens who have the opportunity to speak out 
about their concerns. Increased dialogue between individuals, groups and the state 
would lead to development of Fineman’s idea of a responsive state. A responsive state 
would be useful in care because it would reflect relationships of trust and the 
fluctuating needs of society. 
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5(i) The role of the responsive state 
 
A key point of Fineman’s theory is the role of institutions in the uneven distribution of 
resources. She emphasises that institutions must not be allowed to give privileges to 
certain groups while leaving others at a disadvantage.312 Fineman argues that this is 
where the state should be most responsive. It should endeavour to respond 
appropriately to acknowledged vulnerability and recognise it as a result of being an 
involved, active state. The state should provide individuals with necessary resources 
to encourage resilience but when things go wrong it should be ready to act as a 
support. Fineman’s approach can be seen in contrast with the utilitarian state which 
only intervenes in times of crisis.313 She does not endorse implementation of punitive 
sanctions for those that have not been able to manage. Fineman’s view contrasts with 
the utilitarian system, which views care of family members as a choice.314 In regarding 
care as an option as opposed to an expectation, the state effectively restricts itself 
from becoming involved. One of the most positive facets of having a responsive state 
is that it suggests active participation of citizens. It is a system which can respond 
proactively to concerns identified by people and can make changes as these come to 
light. As a result the state could operate more effectively than searching for solutions 
reactively.  
 
Heightened state responsiveness could be appropriate for problems in care. The state 
would recognise that policies and resources it can provide have a direct impact on 
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lives of individuals.315 If the state largely ignores the issues surrounding care or views 
it as a problem, this can have far-reaching effects on how care is considered by wider 
society. The state has significant power and in constructing care as a private concern 
it undermines the impact it can have on those involved. In delegating care to the private 
realm, the state is at risk of failing to understand the demands and nuances of care. 
As a result it fails to scrutinise care effectively and can struggle to offer adequate 
regulation. Development of resilience would be pivotal to operation of a responsive 
state.316 It could lead to individuals with responsibilities of care becoming more 
equipped to cope. Adoption of the approach would be advantageous to the state and 
its institutions because they would be less likely to be badly affected in times of 
adversity.  Fineman’s formulation of the vulnerable subject is helpful with respect to 
care because it reflects human attributes of those involved in its practice. Fineman’s 
approach reflects humanity and embodiment and it is crucial to recognise these when 
vulnerability becomes more intense.   
 
5(ii) Vulnerability and ideas of ‘failure’ 
 
In considering groups of people whose interests are not appropriately addressed, 
Fineman turns her attention to “vulnerable populations”.317 She identifies the 
individuals in these groups as being viewed to have failed in a system that promotes 
autonomy and personal responsibility. Clarke supports this idea, arguing that people 
have become rights carriers. Central to ideas about rights is an acceptance that we 
are responsible for ourselves and our self-sufficiency.318 Therefore if we do not fit into 
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the model of the paradigm liberal subject we are deemed to have failed.319 Those that 
are seen as belonging to vulnerable groups are regarded as a problem and 
stigmatised for their perceived failure. We can see this from the perspective of 
government which expects its citizens to be ready to engage in paid work or the view 
of wider society. Policy response has been in the way of spreading technological 
surveillance and regulation. For example, in the UK in recent years we have seen the 
introduction of ASBOs.320   
 
One of the measures that an ASBO can enforce is preventing people from visiting their 
town centre.321 ASBOs have often been justified in connection with drinking alcohol in 
public places and has come under criticism from De Verteueil et al.322 Their study 
(among others) illustrated how ASBOs, Public Drinking Exclusion Zones and Town 
Centre Partnerships have been used against homeless people.  Each of these punitive 
measures moves them away from town centres, rendering them invisible. There is an 
argument that this merely moves the issue elsewhere and allows society at large to 
overlook them. Unfortunately there have not been many attempts to tackle the source 
of the problem – groups of people living in poverty, who may have been failed by the 
education system and have few prospects of employment. Instead they have been 
pushed into a space where they can be ignored.  
 
A Home Office review of the subjects of ASBOs in 2002 produced some alarming 
results, which support De Verteueil et al’s arguments. The Home Office report found 
that in 60% of cases where a person received an ASBO there were mitigating factors, 
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including mental health problems, addiction issues or learning disabilities. 323 These 
data reveal that some highly vulnerable groups are affected by ASBOs who may 
struggle to modify their behaviour to socially accepted standards for various reasons. 
Furthermore, a 2007 BIBIC report claims that ASBOs have often been delivered 
without due mental health assessments.324 The BIBIC report states that there is a wide 
disparity as to the weight mental health problems are given in each case. It is clear 
these groups could be labelled as vulnerable but the reaction to them in respect of 
ASBOs seems to be misjudged. 
 
Fineman argues that categorising these kinds of groups as vulnerable is “misleading, 
inaccurate and pernicious”.325 She states that basing these groups on the few 
characteristics they actually have in common renders any differences invisible. For 
Fineman, attributing these labels does not recognise the individual nuances which 
exist between people. As a result of labelling, individual needs are lost and it is 
inevitable those needs will not be recognised or addressed. Even worse, according to 
Fineman, viewing certain groups as vulnerable suggests the rest of us are not. The 
failure to recognise the vulnerability of all human beings is a critical deficiency of the 
liberal state, which has led to developments of policy and attitudes, both social and 
institutional, that we should be as responsible and self-sufficient as possible. Clarke 
states that the citizen has been abandoned because the state is now dominated by 
the market.326 He argues that the economy now directs social policy in a clear move 
                                                          
323 Home Office Research Study 236, A Review of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (2002) 17. 
https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/hors236.pdf Accessed September 4th 2015. 
324 ‘Bibic Research on ASBOs and Young People with Learning Difficulties and Mental Health 
Problems’ BIBIC   [2007] Cited in: ‘Anti-social behaviour and disability – the response of social 
landlords’ Hunter, C., Hodge, N., Nixon, J. and Parr, S. People, Place and Policy [2007] Volume 1 – 
Issue 3 (November) 17. https://extra.shu.ac.uk/ppp-online/anti-social-behaviour-and-disability-the-
response-of-social-landlords/  Accessed September 4th 2015. 
325 Fineman (n5) 16.  
326 Clarke (n200) 452.  
Laura Wares ʹ LLM by Research 
 
65 
 
away from the welfare state initiated following the Second World War. As a result, 
economic focus has led the state to effectively push away from family and domestic 
considerations.327  
 
Although Clarke was writing about New Labour policies, the idea of increasing 
abandonment by the state can be extended to the Coalition’s ‘Big Society’ ethos.328 
The Coalition’s mission statement “We are all in this together” was based on 
encouraging communities to work collaboratively and increase power at a local 
level.329 One of the aims of this policy was to provide groups with powers so they could 
“save local facilities and services threatened with closure, and give communities the 
right to bid to take over local state-run services”.330 These kinds of policies appear to 
mark a shrinking of the state in terms of responsibility and a desire for people to 
assume them instead.  
 
The emphasis on this voluntary role was arguably most highlighted by the fact that 
involvement of this kind would become part of staff assessments for those employed 
by the civil service.331 In line with goals of the liberal state they launched the National 
Citizen Service. The scheme was aimed at teenagers who would be supported in 
developing techniques to become “active and responsible citizens”.332 On one hand, 
this could tie in with Fineman’s valuable idea about developing resilience and 
community support. Yet the policy promotes this as in direct connection with the 
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abandonment of the state in line with Clarke’s view.333 Although the importance of 
building strong and supportive communities is generally viewed as favourable, it is 
questionable as to whether this aim should be because of state withdrawal. Fineman’s 
theory is useful to discussions around care discussed in this chapter. Nevertheless it 
has not been universally endorsed and some critiques have developed concerning the 
proposed move away from identity characteristics.  
 
5(iii) Critiques of Fineman’s theory 
 
Despite the fact that the theory of vulnerability seems to be persuasive in arguments 
for transformation of care, it has attracted criticism. For example, the move away from 
arguments of intersectionality is contentious.334 Fineman’s theory and her reliance on 
the state could be viewed as being insensitive to issues including race. The problem 
lies with the idea that some white modern liberal feminists do not fully understand the 
difficulties associated with racial identification. For instance, Crenshaw has 
emphasised that women of colour are underrepresented in feminist discourse.335 She 
states there is a lack of acknowledgment of the way women of colour are treated 
differently to white women and how this affects their lives. Underrepresentation is a 
significant issue both legally and politically and is exacerbated when you belong to a 
group which identifies as an ethnic minority. In Can the Subaltern Speak? Spivak 
argues that non-Europeans are only considered to become important when they follow 
Western scripts.336 She goes on to argue that “subalterns”, meaning those who are 
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disenfranchised, do not speak the vocabulary that is heard and given weight in the 
corridors of power. Spivak argues that the problem of raising the concern of 
underrepresentation lies with academics. She states that those who do not have power 
should not be deemed solely responsible for fighting for it. If we recognise women as 
a disenfranchised group then Spivak’s argument follows that men also need to be 
fighting for change.  
 
Spivak argues that if the idea of ‘woman’ is constructed as being problematic in itself, 
then poor, black women will suffer more. Spivak is suggesting those women will have 
to struggle harder, not necessarily for equality with men but for equality with other 
women. She continues by stating that often the only voices not heard in connection 
with certain practices are the actual women concerned.337 In contrast to Fineman’s 
view it could be argued that associations such as the black civil rights movement had 
force precisely because of their clear mutual identity. It is generally accepted that the 
voice of a group can be heard much louder than the voice of an individual. Fineman’s 
theory will need to address the issues of race and position of women of colour in order 
to be persuasive to critical race theorists. It is not enough to overlook the difficulties 
this group of women face and perhaps this is where vulnerability theory needs further 
insight. I argue that vulnerability theory still provides a good basis for moving forward 
as an alternative to utilitarianism as a universal approach. As a theory it encompasses 
human beings regardless of gender and provides the cornerstone of a supportive 
state. As such it could offer the most effective footing for promoting appropriate care.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have contrasted the model of the modern liberal subject with feminist 
theories that emphasise the relational and vulnerable nature of human beings. My 
argument is that feminist approaches are progressive as they promote human 
embodiment as a foundation of care. In contrast, the utilitarian state fails to recognise 
people who have needs. Although there have been significant changes in the 
marketplace in the last fifty years with women entering into paid employment, men 
have not taken up a corresponding burden of unpaid care work. Societal expectations 
still result in women being disproportionately subject to care responsibilities. If we 
further consider that women generally live longer than men but not necessarily in a 
healthy way, it can be seen that women are also more likely to be subject to a need 
for care. 
 
The ethics of care highlighted why this was problematic for women as it effectively 
restricts their involvement in society and the marketplace. The theory also emphasises 
the need for trust in fluctuating care situations. It recognises that care cannot be 
assumed to happen through choice, nor is it a natural role that only women can fulfil. 
Instead we need to re-evaluate the role of men too. The purpose of this chapter is not 
to exclude or negate the importance of men in care but instead to encourage and 
enable them to care more.  
 
For this reason I have reiterated the critical need for transformation in how we think 
about and deliver care. In doing so we have to consider the value of care in both family 
and public spheres. I argue that Fineman’s theory of vulnerability would be persuasive 
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in enabling change although I claim that it should be more sensitive to issues of race. 
I do not seek to reject the liberal state entirely but instead to reformulate it. In 
encouraging recognition of universal, not gender specific, vulnerability we can create 
a more equal platform for reimagining care. At the same time the state needs to 
acknowledge the importance of good care and become more responsive to needs and 
concerns of citizens. The gradual shrinking of the state has served to reinforce care 
as a low value, private concern. Active citizens and responsive states can re-establish 
care as a matter for us all to address. In doing so, care can be transformed into 
something which not only affects everyone but something we can all take responsibility 
for. In the next chapter I evaluate several feminist arguments which present challenges 
to the current care framework. I consider arguments about how other countries with 
similar problems have attempted to solve these.  
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Chapter Three – Feminism and adult social care 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I further develop my argument that feminism provides a productive and 
progressive alternative to utilitarianism in relation to the way we think about the 
problems related to the provision of social care. I argue that advances in terms of who 
provides care have been stalled for too long by structural expectations.338 I build upon 
arguments in the previous chapter by providing further empirical evidence showing 
that women are disproportionately affected by care. I draw on academic feminist 
arguments which support my critique of gendered roles.339 I scrutinise how far feminist 
arguments have been successful in achieving a level of equality and ask why this has 
not been extended to care. My argument develops the theme of the last chapter by 
exploring case law from feminist perspectives which underline judicial assumptions 
that women will provide care.340 The cases support my argument that society 
continues to place women in positions of care despite their increased activity in the 
labour market.  
 
I develop my contention that feminism provides the best opportunity for changing how 
social care is delivered. The chapter begins with an examination of feminist viewpoints 
which identify the unequal demands of care on women through both academic 
argument and case law. The middle section of the chapter enlarges on my discussion 
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of the importance of the ethics of care in the second chapter and its necessary 
foundations for understandings of care.341 I use several feminist debates to develop 
my critique of the male basis of the utilitarian, liberal state.342 The final section of this 
chapter considers how countries with similar problems in care have approached 
them.343 I investigate whether their methods can be considered feminist.  
 
2. Adult social care: a feminist concern 
 
In the UK, 66% of people claiming Attendance Allowance are women as are 78% 
claiming Carers Allowance.344 That statistic shows that women are more prone than 
men to require formalised care and Carr states that “aging and caring are gendered in 
ways that are more nuanced and compelling than the simple fact that women live 
longer than men”.345 Carr suggests that while women are more likely to need care due 
to living longer, this is an overly simplistic assumption when it comes to women’s roles 
in care.346 
 
In Chapter 2, I explained that care is a feminist concern because it disproportionately 
affects women. Social care is also a feminist concern because of the impact it has on 
women in the expectation they will provide informal care. I now provide some further 
                                                          
341 Again I particularly focus on the approach developed by Gilligan, introduced in Chapter Two. 
342 Including work by both Hothschild and Tronto (see footnotes 364 and 244 respectively). 
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mental or physical disabilities over the age of 65 who need help with their personal care.  
345 Clements (n10) 681.  
346Ibid 681.  
Laura Wares ʹ LLM by Research 
 
72 
 
statistical data to support my argument as to the extent of care requirements in the 
UK. Age UK have recently found that 371,700 people over 65 were given community 
based care during 2013 and 2014.347 Another 405,000 people over 65 were in 
residential homes in the same time period.348 For the purposes of this work, the most 
significant finding is that 900,000 over 65 with care needs are not being offered any 
kind of formal support at all.349 This finding suggests that if people have care needs, 
these needs are being provided for informally by family and friends. I argue that care 
is still considered to be informal in nature for the most part, becoming visible only when 
the state has to get involved, either through provision of resources or services.  
 
Women, as a result of societal expectations, have been at the forefront of care for 
children and older relatives. The fact that women are increasingly engaged in the paid 
workforce has not reduced that assumption.350 A further problem is that although paid 
work occurs in the public sphere, attracting a quantifiable value, informal care is seen 
as a private and free. Carr has identified this separation between the public and private 
as false.351 She states that “instead there is a spectrum of care provision which has 
emerged in response to policies of de-institutionalisation combined with the retraction 
and refocusing of welfare”.352 Carr’s argument is supported by Daly and Lewis who 
contend that social care is situated at the very crossroads of this alleged divide.353  
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352 Carr (n351) – from a conference speech, quoted at 678 of Clements’ article.  
353 Daly, M and Lewis, J., ‘The concept of social care and the analysis of contemporary welfare states’ 
British Journal of Sociology [2003] Volume 51, Issue 2 282.  
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Clements argues that continued societal expectations that women will perform the bulk 
of care are based on domination of women as a powerless group.354 Those 
expectations have been absorbed by the courts, as can be seen in R (on the 
application of JM and NT) v Isle of Wight Council355 and in R (on the application of 
KM) v Cambridgeshire County Council.356   In both cases, parents who were in their 
sixties expressed concern at the potential lack of support for their adult disabled sons 
since they were already finding it difficult to continue providing care. In both cases, 
local authorities had taken into account the considerable care contributed by the 
parents to their child. However, these assessments were not formulated with a view 
to the long term but based on what was happening at the time. Thus, both sets of 
parents could not be sure what their respective children might be entitled to in the 
future when they were no longer able to cope.   
 
It was recognised by the Judge in KM that local authorities will consider how much 
care family and friends can provide in assessing care support.357 After the mother told 
an assessment officer that she did not feasibly think she could continue to provide 
care at the same level, the officer recorded family support as ‘none’. Wilson LJ stated 
that “No other evidence in the proceedings suggests that the mother has refused to 
continue to play any role in the care of the appellant – living, as he does, within her 
home; on the contrary, see para 32 below. It is hard to avoid concern about the motives 
of the mother in having made such representations”.358 Lord Wilson appears to 
                                                          
354 Clements (n10) 683.  
355 [2011] EWHC 2911 (Admin).  
356 [2012] UKSC 23.  
357 (n355) [19] (Lord Wilson).  
358 (n355) [29] (Lord Wilson).  
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suggest that a mother providing care is a natural assumption, indeed his tone of 
suspicion regarding her motives reflects a lack of understanding of the pressures of 
care. It seems to indicate that the courts are unwilling to assess the impact of this 
expectation on women. The confidence with which local authorities and courts expect 
women to continue care is problematic because the value of care is consistently 
overlooked. Notwithstanding the lack of monetary value attributable to informal care, 
those with family support are not as likely to attract state resources. It is reasonable to 
suppose that in the above cases, an assessment for long term needs might only occur 
when family support had broken down significantly.359  
 
Care has long been viewed as particular to women and a singular defining time in their 
lives.360 In placing the assumption of responsibility for care at the door of women, their 
marginalisation has been reinforced. Care is expected to function as a result of family 
relationships and all that goes with those relationships, both emotional and physical. 
There has been a growth in the number of women engaged in paid work yet much of 
that still involves caring roles.361 Simultaneously there have been a number of social 
changes meaning that families have moved further apart and fewer women are able 
to take on full-time care.362 Subsequently this may be due to either a wish not to 
undertake this responsibility or simply an inability to because of other commitments.363 
                                                          
359 That can be linked to backward looking focus of the utilitarian approach as it waits for a crisis to 
occur before it will take action.  
360 Daly and Lewis (n353) 283.  
361 Ibid 284. These include teaching, nursing and childminding.  
362 Bettio, F., Simonazzi, A. and Villa, P., ‘Change in care regimes and female migration: the ‘care 
drain’ in the Mediterranean’ Journal of European Social Policy [2006] 16(3) 271-285.   
363 For example, paid work, childcare, illness or a reluctance to undertake personal care for a family 
member.  
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Nonetheless this appears to be a Europe wide problem and not simply limited to the 
UK.364  
 
In a response to the shortage of women able to provide care, states have progressively 
redefined what they provide in the way of services. In the UK there has been a welfare 
approach to care since the introduction of the National Assistance Act 1948 which 
provided state support for those in need.365 However, this approach has proved to be 
more expensive than is palatable for governments and not sensitive enough to 
individual needs.366 Accordingly, as the liberal state has changed and resources have 
become strained, welfare support has been restricted.367 There has been a push 
towards individualisation and provision of budgets to enable individuals to buy their 
own services.368  Where state provision of care has been reduced, I suggest that there 
will be an increasing reliance on family and friends to provide caring services. Private 
sector care has increased, particularly in the UK, as a result of a shortage of people 
able to provide informal care.369 Unfortunately there has not been a corresponding 
improvement in wages and conditions for those employed in care organisations.370   
 
                                                          
364 Hothschild, A. R., ‘The Culture of Politics: Traditional, Post-Modern, Cold-Modern and Warm-
Modern Ideals of Care’ Social Politics [1995] 2(3) 331-45. Discussed later in this chapter. 
365 There were several acts introduced around this time including support for housing, the NHS and 
education.  
366 Adema, W., and Ladaique, M., How Expensive is the Welfare State? Gross and Net Indicators in 
the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working 
Papers, No.92 (OECD Publishing 2009) 1-98. 
367 Barry (n179). The case allowed local authorities to consider the implications on their resources 
when developing care packages for individuals.  
368 Series, L. and Clements, L., ‘Putting the cart before the horse, resource allocation systems and 
community care’ Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law [2013] 35:2, 207-226. 
369 Daly and Lewis (n353) 291.  
370 Lewis J, and Glennerster, H., Implementing the New Community Care (Buckingham: Open 
University Press 1996).  
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One consequence of increased marketisation of care services but continuing low 
incomes was the Conservative government’s proposal to introduce a National Living 
Wage in March 2015’s budget.371 The significant increase in hourly rate was seen as 
a threat to care businesses. It is possible that they may in future employ staff under 
temporary contracts and under 25 year olds who are not entitled to the national living 
wage, in order to avoid wage increase implications. The initiative could prove to 
become an obstacle in care because it will not attract long term commitment from 
workers. A significant amount of experience will also be lost where older members of 
staff leave. As a means of stressing what I argue is critical to care, I now return to a 
discussion of the ethics of care. I build on what I introduced in the last chapter, which 
established the basic principles of the approach, developing a more nuanced 
understanding of why I argue that the ethics of care should be the critical foundation 
of good and appropriate care.  
 
3. The ethics of care: why it is important as a basis for care 
 
In the last chapter I introduced the basic principle of Gilligan’s ethics of care theory. 
Gilligan’s work is useful for this work because it recognises that care is mainly 
performed by women and regarded as informal because it occurs within the family.372 
The ethics of care is also connected to the discussion in the next section relating to 
approaches to care in other countries. The case law discussed above illustrates an 
argument raised by the ethics of care – that care is easily overlooked by the state until 
                                                          
371 National Living Wage will ‘damage care homes’, BBC News, August 20th 2015. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-33986252  
372 Gilligan (n4) 8.  
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outside support is required.373 Until families performing functions of care raise 
awareness of their situation, they remain invisible and the assumption is that these 
carers and care recipients are coping well. I suggest that the reciprocal framework of 
the ethics of care should be placed at the centre of social, political and legal 
considerations. In this way the importance of care could be appropriately recognised 
and addressed. 
 
Tronto has long emphasised the reciprocal nature of care, stressing that care is not a 
one way process, nor is it something that is done to a person.374 Care is inherently 
personal and unique in every situation and is built upon developing good relationships. 
Reciprocity is one of the reasons that the broad brush approach of utilitarian policies 
is unsuited to caring. The ethics of care offers a more intuitive way in which care can 
be carried out which reacts more appropriately to the nuances of human needs. Tronto 
stated that she wanted care to be recognisably valued by society because it is 
something we all depend on throughout our lives.375 She argues that feminism can 
challenge accepted structures and attitudes, developing a system of care based on 
respect and what is just. I argue that this means that care, both formal and informal, 
should be recognised as valuable by society and that it should no longer be considered 
as something which solely involves women as care givers. Tronto recognises that 
women have been consistently presented as the gender which is capable of caring the 
most which limits the way care is evaluated more widely.376 For Tronto, the ethic of 
                                                          
373 For example, if an individual or carer applies for benefits in order to support their care. 
374 Tronto (n244)110. 
375 There is a potential connection here with Fineman’s theory of vulnerability in that it remains with us 
throughout our lives.  
376 Tronto (n244) 111.  
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care works most effectively as a way of broadening considerations around the needs 
of everyone, not just those fit into normative ideals.377  
 
Care has been the subject of debate among many feminist writers, including those 
that have expressed concern about the way (particularly informal) care has changed 
as a result of demographic changes.378 Given the increased demands on women to 
engage in paid work, Tronto has argued that care has come to be seen as more of a 
burden as women’s time has become perceptibly limited.379 Tronto’s view is perhaps 
indicative of informal care being viewed as less of a choice than an unreasonable 
expectation in modern life. If that conclusion is correct then it suggests that the way 
care is thought about should be addressed urgently because it will be increasingly 
seen as a constraint for women. In Daniel Engster’s view “Caring is best practiced in 
particular relationships where caregivers can be attentive, responsive, and respectful 
to those needing care”.380 If we examine the contrast between Tronto’s changing view 
of care and Engster’s model for best practice, we can see that the way care is 
considered needs to be re-evaluated. Taking the principles established by the ethics 
of care as a framework, I argue that it is possible that care can be reimagined as 
something valuable which can fully involve men as well as women who want to care.  
In questioning how this could be implemented in the UK I evaluate how problems 
associated with both care and its gendered implications have been approached 
outside Britain.  
                                                          
377 In this way the ethics of care appears to be moving towards a universal approach in the same way 
as Fineman’s vulnerability theory. 
378 Cooper, D., Everyday Utopias – the conceptual life of promising spaces (Duke University Press 
2014) 113.  
379 Tronto, J., ‘Time’s Place’ Feminist Theory [2003] Vol.4, 2 119-138, 124. 
380 Engster, D., The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory (Oxford University Press 2007) 
55. 
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4. A comparative analysis of care in other countries 
 
In order to explore the possibilities feminism offers for the repositioning of care as a 
central social and political concern I now consider reforms in other countries with 
similar problems to the UK.  The difficulties presented by changing care requirements, 
particularly in welfare based states, have been identified in terms of social, financial 
and demographic diversity.381 Common problems in care have not been restricted to 
one or two countries but are part of a wider dilemma.382  In the Netherlands, discourse 
around care in relation to reorganisation of health and social welfare has been 
introduced into policy areas. 383  Emphasis has come through reconsideration of public 
resources and discontent with public services.384 Daly and Lewis attribute the main 
problem in care provision everywhere as being the reduction in available family 
support.385 They claim women’s lives have changed and either through need to work 
or a wish not to care, they are simply not able to care in the way they used to.386   
 
As a result, countries have increasingly become aware of the demographic and social 
changes affecting care and the impact they are having. The Dutch government have 
been relocating care politically since the 1990s.387 Sevenhuijsen cites both Bovens388 
and Witteveen389 as claiming that the shrinking of the state as an entity has led to 
                                                          
381 Daly and Lewis (n353) 283.  
382 Ibid 288. 
383 Sevenhuijsen (n11) 179.  
384 Daly and Lewis (n353) 289.  
385 Sevenhuijsen (n11) 289. 
386 Daly and Lewis (n353) 289.  
387 Sevenhuijsen (n11) 180.  
388 Bovens, M., ‘De verplaatsing van de politiek. Een agenda voor democratische vernieuwing’, 
(Amsterdam: Wardi Beckman Stichting, 1995).  
389 Witteveen, W., ‘De denkbeeldige staat. Voorstellingen van democratische vernieuwing’, 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000).  
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conflict being removed from the state to more localised arenas including head offices 
and courts.390 In turn this means that while state power and accountability is reduced, 
the power of these institutions is correspondingly increased and it can be difficult to 
hold these organisations to account.391 As Sevenhuijsen highlights, Bovens and 
Witteveen believe the answer lies in an alternative kind of governance that focuses on 
accessibility, transparency and approachability.392 Following that approach could then 
lead to a more active role for citizens because they might recognise inequalities more 
easily and play a persuasive part in remedying that situation.393 Nevertheless in order 
to enable citizens to help bring about these changes, governments need to be open 
and responsive.  
 
Sevenhuijsen argues that by encouraging governments to account for their decisions 
in a transparent manner, this creates a situation in which people and policy makers 
can work together to bring about positive change.394 It is hoped this type of reciprocal 
discourse would lead to meaningful interaction.  Her view suggests an approach akin 
to the ethic of care as it acknowledges interdependency.395 The discourse promoted 
by the ethics of care leads to a recognition of care as relational, supportive and 
advantageous to society as a whole.396 The ethic of care wants to move away from an 
individualist approach and individual blame connected to the liberal state, and order 
to ensure that importance of individuals being able to participate in their own care is 
                                                          
390 Witteveen (n389) 13.  
391 Sevenhuijsen (n11) 180.  
392 Ibid 180.  
393 There appears to be connections here which could include Hemmings affective solidarity argument 
and Fineman’s idea of active citizens and the responsive state.  
394 Sevenhuijsen (n11) 180.  
395 Ibid 182.  
396 Sevenhuijsen (n11) 182-185. 
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recognised by the state.397 As Sevenhuijsen argues, the individuals involved in care 
can only develop their own capabilities once their individual regard has been perceived 
and valued.398  
 
Bacchi compares the approach to social care in the Netherlands with that in 
Canada.399 Although she critiques the Dutch model because it begins with the idea 
there are arbitrary power relationships between the sexes, she believes that the 
Netherlands offer more of an opportunity for modification than Canada.400 Her view is 
that Canada still differentiates between the sexes as opposed to “gender relations”.401. 
She states the Dutch approach is superior because it allows for queries to be asked 
about ways gendered expectations have been created.402 Nevertheless Bacchi 
criticises the Netherlands as refusing to overtly recognise that “gender relations” are 
not inherent in policy decisions.403  
 
Bacchi’s argument supports mine as she critiques the initiatives of the World Bank and 
EU Commission which aimed to increase the involvement of women in paid work while 
failing to consider care commitments.404 She argues these policies support males in 
particular careers to engage in caring for children but overlooks the way women are 
rooted in either low paid work or no work at all.405 Bacchi notes that this means that 
the Dutch expect lone (female) parents of children over 5 years old to work.406 
                                                          
397 Sevenhuijsen (n11) 183. 
398 Ibid 183. 
399 Bacchi (n193) 17. Bacchi’s argument was introduced in chapter two. 
400 Ibid 21.  
401 Bacchi (n193) 25.  
402 Ibid 25.  
403 Bacchi (n193) 26. 
404 Ibid 29.  
405 Bacchi (n193) 26. 
406 Ibid 29.  
Laura Wares ʹ LLM by Research 
 
82 
 
Unfortunately this drive has not been supported by improved provision of childcare.407 
In response Bacchi has developed what she calls “Deep Evaluation” which presents 
ways in which to consider long term and wider effects of policy than ever before.408 In 
a similar idea to active citizenship, she wants to encourage broader discussions about 
policies and include those who wish to become involved.409 Although Bacchi argues 
in favour of equality and awareness that men are also concerned about care, she 
warns against adopting “one size fits all” policies which have failed in the past.410 Her 
argument is significant in care because those policies tend to label people and push 
them into groups, including gendered ones.  
 
Considerations of gender are significant to care because of the unequal expectations 
placed on men and women. Sevenhuijsen argues that although men are taking an 
increasing role in care, this has not occurred at a comparable rate to women joining 
the workforce.411 To counteract the expectation that women should work as well as 
care, the Dutch government have developed a more gender neutral approach allowing 
women to combine paid work and care.412 Sevenhuijsen views these policies as 
understanding what people actually want and how they live. She attributes this to an 
ethic of care approach built upon ideas of vulnerability, dependency and trust.413 
Despite her claim that the Dutch approach was influenced by the ethics of care, 
Sevenhuijsen claims there remains an emphasis on family providing care in the 
Netherlands. She argues policies should be developed with the ever changing and 
                                                          
407 Bacchi (n193) 29. 
408 Ibid 30.  
409 Bacchi (n193) 31. 
410 Ibid 31.  
411 Sevenhuijsen (n11) 181.  
412 Ibid 193.  
413 Sevenhuijsen (n11) 185.  
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diverse nature of care in mind and support informal care.414 State recognition of that 
kind would be a step forward as it suggests the state would actively recognise the 
existence and benefits of familial care. There should be weight placed on enabling 
individuals to choose whether they undertake this care and if they do, how society can 
support that.415 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The intention of this chapter has been to further establish the ethics of care as the 
central point of deliberations about the future of care in the UK. I noted various 
contentions associated with this including the way informal care is formulated as a 
private concern and therefore not an area which concerns the state. As a result 
informal care is only noticed when a request for support for state resources is made. 
In turn this is viewed as undesirable in view of restricted state revenue, both practically 
and financially. Simultaneously there is an increasing commercial market for care, 
including home care as well as residential homes. Although these can be seen to meet 
need to an extent, they are still mainly staffed by women. In seeking to find a challenge 
to the female focused nature of care I identified the ethics of care as a means of 
considering care provision and practice in a different way.  
 
The ethics of care is valuable because it is the most widely known feminist care theory. 
It has advantages when considering care because it highlights the importance of care 
as a relationship of trust and reciprocity. In order to provide good care, carers and the 
                                                          
414 Sevenhuijsen (n11) 189. 
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cared for should be enabled to build a relationship based on these factors. The ethics 
of care is critical to the development of care because it can provide a framework 
identifying what is important in care practice. The ethics of care is persuasive in adult 
social care because of its focus on human needs and not resources. It recognises the 
changes in expectations of women in terms of paid work while the confidence that 
women will continue to be primarily responsible for care has not altered accordingly. 
In reinforcing ideas that female obligations are private, female voices are silenced, as 
recognised by Gilligan. In bringing the family arena into the public domain there is 
more possibility that we might address the inequalities these assumptions lead to.  
Nonetheless the challenges associated with contemporary care and how society will 
address these is not limited solely to the UK.  
 
The problem that fewer women are available to care in light of a growing older 
population has not been adequately addressed. Notwithstanding, it has been 
recognised as a Europe wide challenge and some other countries have taken steps to 
try and tackle this. The Netherlands began to alter the situation in the 1980s and 
policies have been adopted accordingly. They appear to have taken a gender neutral 
approach and developed policies which recognise the contribution of men to care. The 
Dutch have formulated schemes which enable paid work to be flexible and adaptive 
to providing care at home. Sevenhuijsen argues there has been an ethics of care 
approach developed in the Netherlands but notes that primary responsibility for care 
is still assumed to be undertaken by family members. Although there is limited 
evidence at present, these systems appear to work more effectively than the current 
UK model. Nevertheless there continue to be significant problems and these need 
further examination.   
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If we are going to develop progressive feminist policies in care, I argue that it is 
imperative that everyone involved in that process should be considered equally. Men 
should be encouraged to get more involved in care practice but not simply because 
women would rather not. If we are going to enjoy true gender neutral care, both women 
and men should have the choice about paid work and/or care. What we need to 
develop are policies which can adapt to the changing requirements of people’s lives. 
Policies which support enablement to care could enhance care practice as women 
would not view it as an expectation simply by virtue of their gender.  Men might be 
more willing to undertake caring responsibilities and have talks with their employers 
as to how that can happen. I argue that feminism can offer an analytical tool with which 
to tackle new and emerging problems of care. In the next chapter I will explore legal 
technologies in care.   
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Chapter Four – Judicial thinking and social care 
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter one I identified how judicial reasoning targets outcomes and resources as 
part of the broader calculus of the utilitarian state. In this chapter I build on that analysis 
by extending it to include a discussion of risk and the tensions concerning risk between 
local authorities over care planning and the courts in their review of those plans. My 
focus is on care plans required under the Care Act 2014 and I suggest that they 
become legal technology as a by-product of utilitarian thinking. Care plans are 
compiled by local authorities and they repeatedly focus on tight resources and 
avoidance of risk. I examine these issues in the context of case law and discuss how 
local authorities manage the allocation of resources via the care plan and then how 
judges respond to challenges to care plans.  In considering case law I evaluate how 
local authorities have framed the alleged risk posed by family members as a means 
to follow particular courses of action. Although my argument is that both courts and 
local authorities thinking are informed by utilitarianism, my analysis of the case law 
reveals critical differences between in their approaches.  
 
The beginning of the chapter discusses the role of risk in modern society. I evaluate 
arguments put forward by social scientists such as Ulrich Beck416 and Anthony 
Giddens417 who argue that risk is ever changing.  I scrutinise the way risk is discussed 
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in relation to care and consider how valuable the development of informed risk might 
be as a way of involving the service user more directly in their own care.418 I analyse 
how, if at all, informed risk might apply to those that lack capacity.  I argue that when 
assessing individual risk against blanket utilitarian policies, local authorities adopt a 
paternalistic approach that displaces utilitarian values. I analyse how courts consider 
notions of risk and how they resist paternalistic alternatives to utilitarianism.419 
Paternalism is problematic in care because the wishes of social workers, families and 
carers then take precedence over those of the care recipients such that the individual 
at the centre of care is overlooked. 420   
 
The middle section of this chapter discusses the role of care plans in the case of 
McDonald in connection with both local authority and courts’ attitudes to resource 
allocation.421 I consider how in McDonald risk was promoted as a means of justifying 
a care plan which the individual argued ignored her wishes and dignity.422 I critique the 
utilitarian focus that the majority judges applied in this judgment, highlighting the 
importance they placed on risk, resources and the eventual outcome. 
 
The final section of the chapter focuses on judicial thinking where the care recipient 
lacks legal capacity. The cases illustrate that those individuals without capacity are 
often significantly affected by the contrasting wishes of those involved in their care.423 
                                                          
418 Marchant (n14).  
419 There is a comparative analysis of utilitarianism and utilitarianism in terms of practical technology 
in the next chapter. 
420 Discussed further in the next chapter.   
421 McDonald (n3). 
422 McDonald concerned an individual who challenged her care plan after the local authority 
reinterpreted her needs as incontinence rather than mobility in order to reduce her care package and 
save money. 
423 The identified cases have been found through Westlaw legal database using search terms 
including the words ‘care homes, residential care and mental capacity. 
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Further to my discussion of risk, I identify cases where the local authority has deemed 
a particular relative to pose a level of risk to the individual. My argument is that, in fact, 
local authorities are keen to implement care plans and can react inappropriately if the 
care plan is opposed by family members. As a result courts are left to analyse 
discourse around risk in relation to potential outcomes and re-establish the central 
position of the individual.   
 
I develop the last chapter’s theme by recognising there are considerable and varied 
problems in adult social care which are currently not appropriately addressed. I have 
argued a feminist approach would assist in building a better care framework and 
support that by illustrating how utilitarian values are inappropriate to care 
implementation. I highlight the reasons why I claim that both utilitarianism and 
paternalism are inadequate approaches to care and how legal technology needs a 
more sympathetic application. Instead I present the argument that feminist legal 
thinking would be a more appropriate approach to improve care.  
 
2. Understandings of risk in modern societies 
 
There is a misconception that risk is a relatively new consideration resulting from 
development of modern societies.424  Beck, a leading theorist of risk in the liberal state, 
argued that it is modernisation itself which has heightened awareness of risk.425 
Theorists do not claim there was no risk in the past merely that different types have 
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emerged as a result of increased industrialisation.426 Beck’s view was built on an idea 
that risk has always existed but has altered alongside changes in modernisation. Beck 
argued that ‘manufactured risks’, as pinpointed by Giddens in his 1999 work, produced 
by human beings are in fact more harmful than natural risks such as hurricanes, floods 
etc.427 Adult social care has not been immune from increasing concerns with risk 
promoted by new technologies.428 The case law supports Beck’s argument that risk 
changes with not only with technological progress but also because of changing 
human understandings of risk.  I consider it valuable to try and reduce risk in care to 
a negligible level but do not claim that all risk should be avoided. I recognise that 
wholesale elimination of risk would not be normal or desirable in the majority of 
situations, especially if we accept that risk is a routine part of life.  
 
Beck argued that notions of risk are borrowed from the expansion of technology and 
desire to exercise individual choice.429 He enlarged on his previous work which noted 
that traditional structures of society had been modified and there was added 
importance placed on individual agents.430 We can identify the responsibility placed 
on individuals through changes in care policies which promote individualisation but 
simultaneously placed restrictions on choice through resources, including Direct 
Payment schemes. Beck sees equality as being compromised by risk because of 
growing demand for self-determination which is balanced by dependence and need 
for the benefits of safe relationships.431 Beck states that if men fail to act to strengthen 
equality in line with their intentions, structural inequality will be reinforced through that 
                                                          
426 Beck (n13) 19. 
427 Giddens (n13) 44.  
428 Care technologies will be further discussed in the next chapter.  
429 Beck (n424) 25.   
430 Ibid 3.  
431 Beck (n424) 3.  
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lack of action.432 There has been a recognition in care in respect of autonomy but this 
has been circumvented to an extent by a desire to promote safety.  The emphasis the 
liberal state places on individual autonomy has particular consequences for those in 
receipt of social care in terms of risk arguments.  
 
Giddens, another prominent risk theorist, considers risk to be integral to both 
“probability and uncertainty”.433 He points out that where a result is absolutely certain, 
there is no risk. He identifies a need to distinguish between deliberate risk taking and 
exposure to inadvertent risk. Deliberate risk taking could be viewed as a more 
autonomous decision than being exposed to risk by others or being unaware of the 
risk. In consequentialist theories, including utilitarianism, the value of taking risks is 
ultimately decided on the outcome. Therefore if a result turns out to be bad, then on 
reflection the risk would be considered to be a bad choice. If the end result was 
positive, the risk would be deemed to be acceptable. From a utilitarian perspective 
only risks with unsatisfactory results would be viewed as detrimental.  
 
The elimination of risk has been problematic in care because it has led to policies that 
fail to place weight on individuality. What might be considered to be good for some 
may be detrimental to others. The utilitarian maxim of the benefit for the majority fails 
in connection with care because it neglects to evaluate complex needs. The 
maximisation of happiness for the majority in utilitarianism would consider that risks 
associated with a particular technology or condition in care could lead to benefits for 
most and would be applied to all. If this approach caused unforeseen or unpredictable 
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consequences to a few this would be overlooked because of its advantages for others. 
In care, where the potential results might be particularly deleterious, this blanket 
method is arguably a significant risk in itself. Nevertheless the courts have had an 
interesting approach concerning risks in care.  
 
2(i) How risk has been considered by the courts 
 
In the past courts have taken a realistic and pragmatic approach to the idea of risk. In 
his dissenting judgement in a 1919 espionage case, Abrams v United States, Holmes 
J stated that, “all life is an experiment”.434 He recognised that life carries risks and that 
we should embrace some of these rather than endeavour to prevent them.   Every day 
we manage commonplace hazards such as crossing the road or driving a car and 
accept them almost without thought. . Holmes J noted that “every year if not every day 
we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect 
knowledge”.435 His statement acknowledges that some level of risk is inherent to 
human life and that we have to accept that we cannot always predict end results. He 
seemed to be arguing that eliminating risk was not only impossible, but undesirable.   
 
In the UK courts have tried to find a realistic balance in considering levels of risk in 
care. A similar attitude can be seen in the 1954 negligence case of Watt v Hertfordshire 
County Council.436 Here Denning LJ stated “It is well settled that in measuring due 
care you must balance the risk against the measures necessary to eliminate the risk” 
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and “against the end to be achieved”.437 The case centred on a fireman on his way to 
rescue a woman trapped under a vehicle. The fireman had to carry a heavy jack in the 
fire engine but when it braked suddenly, Watt, another fire fighter was injured when 
the jack fell on him. Denning LJ took care to remind the court they should keep the 
intended result in mind when trying to balance other considerations. If we accept that 
we cannot eliminate all risk then we have the potential to create a legal care framework 
which concentrates on which risks we deem to be acceptable. For risks society does 
not deem to be reasonable, open discourse would be encouraged in order to develop 
an effective plan for individual cases. Both cases consider risk as an inevitable and 
normal part of life. Each considered what risks would generally be considered to be 
acceptable to society in general.  It is critical that views of all those involved in care 
are evaluated carefully but particularly the individuals subject to care provision.   
 
2(ii) Establishing what is a reasonable risk in care 
 
As discussed in chapter one, increasing importance has been placed on issues 
including autonomy, rights and individualisation in care by the liberal state. Yet this 
sits awkwardly with the growing culture of trying to eliminate risk whenever possible.438 
The impact of risk elimination can mean that autonomy of care recipients can be 
discounted by the risk averse considerations of others. I consider this approach to be 
paternalistic because although it may be advantageous to carers, families and local 
authorities, it restricts the ability of the individual from making their own choices. 
Although it can be tempting for care providers to adopt paternalistic approaches 
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towards care of the vulnerable, this does not lead to good care. Marchant advocates 
the idea of accepting what he sees as “reasonable risks” in care as opposed to simply 
attempting to eliminate them all.439 
  
Marchant recognises that carers can be in a very difficult position.440 In permitting 
some level of risk taking they have to gauge potential outcomes. In chapter one I 
established that utilitarian judges focus on outcomes and I argue that they will consider 
risk in light of the potential outcome of their judgment. Carers need to decide on an 
appropriate time to stop an activity if it develops into too much of a risk. For instance, 
it may be that a dementia patient can wander for a certain distance but this would be 
curtailed if there was a busy road or stream nearby. We can see that carers are 
treading a fine line when evaluating risks, particularly around those that lack 
capacity.441 In terms of resources, having one to one individual care is expensive. In 
addition, any care which the state provides can result in legal and financial penalties 
when something goes wrong.442 As will be seen from the case law later in this chapter, 
local authorities have to be highly aware of risks in care and how to limit these through 
provision of resources and reduction in state involvement in care.    
  
There has been a contentious move by government away from accepting the state’s 
role in managing the risks and responsibilities of social care. The NHS and Community 
Care Act 1990 was the first legislation to shift responsibility for adult social care to local 
authority social care departments. The premise of that Act has been most recently 
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restated by the Conservative and Liberal Coalition government in its 2010 White 
Paper.443 The White Paper espoused a “radical approach” which built on the idea of 
community infrastructure and support.444 It placed an emphasis on encouraging 
resilience and responsiveness among the population, thus reducing state liability in 
social care. However this shift towards greater individual responsibility for care begs 
the question as to whether we can expect a general standard of provision. Marchant 
argues local authorities will slide more towards paternalistic approaches that restrict 
those carers and care recipients who want to take more risks.445 In effect, he is 
suggesting increased adoption of a blanket approach towards what are deemed to be 
acceptable risks. What is viewed as acceptable will be decided by local authorities 
who are under pressure in relation to safety within limited resources. Restricting risk 
allows the local authority to reduce risks taken by the cared for, thereby diminishing 
autonomy.   
 
There is a suspicion that we now concentrate on preventing something potentially 
serious happening instead of considering what could be positive about taking risks.446 
To counteract this approach, Marchant develops the notion of informed risks.447 He 
suggests that we should accept that we all have a right to take risks whether subject 
to care or not.448 His approach is positive from the view that it would allow care 
recipients to take some considered risks. Although this is a way of exercising 
                                                          
443 Healthy Lives, Healthy People: Our strategy for Public Health in England. Government White 
Paper 2010. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/healthy-lives-healthy-people-our-strategy-
for-public-health-in-england 
444 Ibid 9.  
445 Marchant (n14) 11.  
446 McLoughlin, K., Regulation and risk in social work: the General Social Care Council and the Social 
Care Register in context, British Journal of Social Work [2007] Vol 37, No.7, 1263-1277.   
447 Marchant (n14) 19.  
448 Ibid 19. 
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autonomy it is harder to envisage in relation to those that do not have capacity.449 It 
would be reasonably difficult, if not impossible in some cases, to ascertain how far 
individuals understood the risk they were taking. I view this as a limitation in Marchant’s 
argument and it again raises the importance of re-evaluating care of those without 
capacity.  
 
There is a powerful impetus in care practice to minimise levels of risk which particularly 
impacts those without capacity as they are subject to carers and families’ wishes. It is 
also possible that anxieties about litigation influence behaviour.450 There exists a 
strong antipathy to different kinds of risk in care settings, suggesting a compelling 
desire to protect people as completely as possible. Risk can be invoked as a 
persuasive argument in order to attempt to prevent unwanted outcomes or as means 
to enhance safety. Giddens stated that “Society is increasingly preoccupied with the 
future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk”.451 Although utilitarian 
judicial thinking focuses on outcomes, ideas about potential risk can be viewed as 
based on fear of consequences of risk taking.    
 
Giddens’ argument acknowledges that society has changed in its perceptions and 
ideas about risk while highlighting our desire to stay safe. His claim is pertinent in 
relation to those we deem as in need or vulnerable. Our ideas of risk are calculated 
on what we know and the likelihood of possible outcomes based on that knowledge. 
However, considerations based on outcomes do not fully support the uncertainty of 
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life or fluctuations of human embodiment. In care, an approach based on generalised 
outcomes is problematic because a person with one set of requirements or 
characteristics will not experience exactly the same results as another. A resulting lack 
of predictability is what elevates discourses around risk to levels of considerable 
concern. These worries are evident in care plans, documents which set out assessed, 
eligible needs and the manner in which the local authority plans to meet them. The 
process of developing care plans involves service users and carers as an attempt to 
control risk on the basis of primary prevention within a particular resource envelope. 
However it is not possible to rule out all uncertainty as to the ultimate result.  
 
2 (iii) Care plans as legal technology 
 
Care plans are legally required by sections 9 and 10 of the Care Act 2014.452 The Care 
Act stipulates that care plans determine need and whether individuals meet local 
authority criteria regarding whether those needs will be met.453 They carry legal weight, 
identifying appropriate care technologies and apparatus for service users.454 Care 
plans depend on social worker’s expertise and their relationship with the service user. 
Local authority social workers are aware of pressure to meet needs within constrained 
budgets. Care plans reflect often unique complex needs, having significant 
consequences when implemented. Furthermore, legislation stipulates that while 
preparing the care plan, the local authority has to include both the individual and the 
carer.455 The onus is on local authorities to take reasonable steps to reach an 
                                                          
452 The Care Act came into force in April 2015. It modernises and consolidates several previous Acts.  
453 Care Act 2014 s1(1), 
454Carr (n1) 216. Care plans set out how assessed eligible needs will be met. They detail which needs 
the local authority is going to meet and how that will be done. 
455 Ibid s1 (3). 
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understanding with individuals and carers about how needs will be met, requiring a 
degree of co-operation and understanding between local authorities, service users and 
carers.456  
 
Care plans touch on various aspects of a care recipient’s life and are reviewed 
regularly.457 Carr notes that David Engel has pinpointed the intimate levels of personal 
detail and information they carry in respect of the individual they pertain to.458 Care 
plans rely on social workers’ perception of often complicated levels of need and their 
conclusions apply not only at the time of the assessment but also into the future.459 If 
we accept, as I argued in the first chapter, that law reinforces social norms, legally 
valid care plans can be understood as reflecting normal assumptions.460 When a local 
authority care plan is challenged the manner in which judges understand the plans is 
critical. There can be significant differences between the provisions local authorities 
are willing to make and the desires of the service user. If judges accept care plans as 
buttresses of expected care provision, individuals will find it difficult to persuade them 
otherwise.  
 
There can be conflicts between resources and need, and these conflicts potentially 
increase once the wishes of individual care recipients and their families are 
considered. As identified in the case law below, the care recipients who are subjects 
of the care plan might be framed in a certain way in order to allow the local authority 
                                                          
456 Care Act s1 (5).  
457 NHS Choices - Care and Support Plans www.nhs.uk/Conditions/social-care-and-support-
guide/Pages/care-plans.aspx . Accessed October 16th 2015.  
458 Origin Myths: Narratives of Authority, Resistance, Disability and Law, 27 Law and Society Review 
[1993] 785. 
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to develop and implement its plan. Care plans reflect expectations of local authorities 
and in doing so, conform to utilitarian resource maximisation for the majority, resource 
based decision outcomes and compulsions to eliminate risk.  
 
3. Local authority expectations and resources 
 
McDonald, discussed in chapter one, illustrates how judicial decision making 
operationalises a utilitarian calculus of outcomes, resources and risk in the context of 
care plans.  The decision has been described as a “triumph of black letter law” by 
Clements, who viewed the decision as law taking priority over individuals.461 Ms 
McDonald challenged her care plan, which reinterpreted her mobility needs as 
incontinence in order to reduce the cost of care. The court’s majority judgment (Lady 
Hale dissented) allowed Kensington and Chelsea to furnish Ms McDonald with 
incontinence pads instead of providing a night carer to help Ms McDonald access her 
commode at night. The local authority used the care plan to reinterpret mobility 
problems as incontinence which was linked in court to outcomes, resources and risk 
for both the local authority and Mrs McDonald. 462 As a technology in themselves, 
incontinence pads would appear to be an inappropriate device with which to address 
mobility problems.463 Although incontinence pads are more cost effective than an all-
night carer, Ms McDonald argued these were an affront to her dignity. Instead, the 
care plan allowed for a carer to arrive at Ms McDonald’s flat each morning to help her 
wash.464  
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There was a financial motive as the saving for the local authority would amount to 
£22,000 per annum.465 Therefore the alternative technology suggested in the care plan 
was highly cost effective. The assessment used to produce the care plan introduced 
the idea of risk and was based on enabling Ms McDonald to urinate safely at night.466 
The local authority recognised there were risks associated with her getting out of bed 
during the night. In replacing a carer with pads the risks could be reduced to a 
negligible amount but at the cost of Ms McDonald’s dignity and autonomy.467 The 
outcome suggests there is considerable weight placed on the way needs are defined 
in care plans. Brown LJ held that the reviews following the 2008 care plan did not 
mean that the local authority should have to continue the same package stating “there 
can be no objection…to the respondents identifying and meeting the appellants’ night-
time needs in the manner proposed”.468 As a result, this kind of rationale can have a 
considerable impact on individuals at the heart of care. It can be argued the majority 
judges had limited their resource outcome deliberations to the local authority’s 
perspective. The influence of utilitarianism can be seen through reducing cost and 
using arguments of risk to prevent Ms McDonald leaving her bed. Although the 
outcome was positive for the state, it was far from adequate for the individual. 
McDonald highlights how utilitarianism fails those subject to care and Carr states that 
the vulnerable adult is then formulated as “a welfare subject rather than a rights-
bearing citizen”.469 As an individual with needs, the utilitarian system overlooks 
discourse involving rights, instead framing that person as reliant on state support. 
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The local authority’s arguments around risk and safety were persuasive to the majority 
judges in McDonald.470 If we accept incontinence pads and sheeting as a technology, 
they were used to enhance safety while overlooking Ms McDonald’s desire for a night 
carer. There appeared to be a contrast between how the court viewed concepts of 
safety and the fact she felt safer with assistance from a carer. Although it was not in 
force at the time, the Care Act now places statutory emphasis on the wishes of the 
individual.471 How this emphasis will operate in practice in terms of conflict between 
individuals and local authorities remains to be seen.472 Ms McDonald was placed in a 
position where she became subject to the rationalisation of others including the local 
authority and court. The care plan was instrumental in framing her this way because 
of the assessment produced by the local authority. As a legal technology, the care 
plan was compelling in court but proved detrimental to the choices and dignity of Ms 
McDonald. There have been concerns raised about the warehousing of elderly care 
by the voluntary sector.473  Warehousing refers to the problems identified in this work 
concerning the growing elderly population, lack of available carers and the way care 
is provided on a general level. The case of McDonald is an example of the utilitarian 
value of majority maximisation at the expense of individuals. Although the focus of this 
work rejects utilitarian principles in care, utilitarian discourse seems to step aside and 
be replaced by paternalism in cases where individuals lack capacity. My argument is 
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that this is equally problematic. In light of this concern, I turn now to cases where risk 
has been identified by local authorities in terms of relationships of those lacking 
capacity.   
 
4. Risky relationships and perceptions of local authorities and the courts level 
 
In McDonald the court supported the local authority’s care plan on grounds of safety 
and resources despite Ms McDonald (who had capacity) expressing quite distinct 
wishes. Here I consider cases where individuals who lacks capacity are in 
relationships that local authorities interprets as risky. In A London Local Authority v JH 
the husband of the individual who was the subject of the care plan, was deemed to be 
detrimental to his wife’s care.474 The question before the court was whether Mrs H had 
capacity to decide where she wanted to live.475 Despite her previously expressed 
desire to remain at home, the local authority wanted her to live in a residential home.476 
The local authority not only believed that Mrs H would be safer in residential care, such 
an arrangement would result in savings to its budget. Her husband wanted her to live 
at home and had been providing care for her complex needs for a long time.477 The 
local authority did accept his care had been good but following Mrs H’s second stroke, 
they decided to reduce the care package.478 At the same time the local authority 
offered Mr H just three hours of respite against the twenty four hours each week he 
requested to meet his own health needs if Mrs H did remain at home with him.   
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The local authority invoked the language of risk in order to support its assessment and 
its decision to place her in residential care. Mr H was framed as being uncooperative 
because he resisted the local authority decision.479 As a result, the local authority 
claimed it was too risky for Mrs H to return home to him.480 Mr H’s care of his wife had 
always been accepted as good prior to this, suggesting it was because he did not 
acquiesce to the new package that he had become a risk.  The local authority resisted 
acknowledging that Mr H was likely to be the most appropriate judge of his wife’s 
feelings, instead presenting him as difficult.481 Mr and Mrs H’s desire to remain 
together as a married couple was seen as unnecessarily obstructive by the local 
authority. Rather than trying to find an acceptable middle ground, the local authority 
then sought a deprivation of liberty application for Mrs H. Ultimately this was not 
viewed to be appropriate by the court.482 The court’s view suggests that 
implementation of a care plan will not be considered the most important factor when 
evaluating parties arguments about risk apparently posed by family members.  
 
Adult social care cases involving individuals that lack capacity are heard by the Court 
of Protection which, in contrast to local authorities, appears to consider family 
positively.483 Series, an academic and social care blogger, notes that where an 
individual or their family member does not concur with a proposed care plan, local 
authorities will raise concerns. Further she argues that in trying to limit care spending, 
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individuals will be expected to invite strangers into their homes and fit in with carers’ 
schedules. If we apply a utilitarian viewpoint we can see that costs and time constraints 
become the over-riding factor in care rather than individuals.  
 
In JH the court actively resisted the local authority’s construction of risk. Eldergill DJ 
commented that although the local authority was critical of Mr H’s reluctance to 
compromise, they were not open to adjustment either.484 Furthermore Eldergill DJ 
found that while Mr H had been prepared to make some concessions, the local 
authority had remained resolute. Although Mr H admitted to the court that he was not 
the easiest person to get along with, the court did not consider him to be a risk.485  
Eldergill DJ placed sizeable weight on the couple’s long term relationship and found 
in their favour in his interim decision.486 The court’s decision highlights the balancing 
act local authorities must keep in mind when examining the relationships of those 
lacking capacity and risk. In JH it appears that utilitarian resource and outcome 
considerations were viewed as secondary by the Eldergill DJ in comparison with the 
couple’s relationship. The case is notable because although risk was discussed in 
terms of Mrs H’s health, her husband was constituted by the local authority to pose 
the greatest risk. The court rejected the local authority’s position, instead placing value 
on the husband’s care and knowledge of his wife’s longstanding wishes.  
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4(i) Risky relationships and their effect on care plans 
 
Another long term relationship had previously been a key focus of the enablement of 
the care plan in Local Authority X v MM (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor), 
KM.487 MM lacked capacity to litigate, to decide where she could live or manage 
finances.488 Although MM’s case centred on whether she had capacity to marry or to 
have a sexual relationship, it is relevant to analysis here from a risk perspective. 
Although MM and her husband KM had lived together for long periods during their 
relationship, the local authority believed that they ought to live apart.489 MM was a 
vulnerable adult and her relationship with KM had some highly detrimental aspects. 
There had been an effect on MM’s wellbeing in the past as well as occasions of 
domestic violence. KM himself had mental health problems and coupled with his 
noticeable influence on MM was deemed to be a significant risk to her.490  
 
The case went to court on several occasions and at times MM went missing.491 MM’s 
absence was attributed to KM and on one occasion, Bodey J ordered that KM must 
assist the police and local authority in returning MM safely.492 There were ongoing 
concerns about contact and KM had been aggressive and abusive towards staff caring 
for MM in the past.493 The court restricted contact in order to protect staff.494 The local 
authority had reduced contact from twice weekly to two hours a month.495 MM made it 
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clear that she wished to continue a relationship with her husband and viewed this as 
unacceptable.496  
 
Although KM had been a negative influence on MM, the local authority’s construction 
of risk led to punitive sanctions for MM herself. MM’s case highlights the difficulties 
local authorities face when trying to protect vulnerable people from exploitation and 
abuse. The local authority’s responsibility becomes especially difficult when this 
occurs in the context of personal relationships. The response of the court to these 
kinds of considerations has to be appropriately sensitive and evaluate the pros and 
cons in each situation. The Court of Protection’s position is unique in deciding issues 
concerning those without capacity. According to Bartlett the court in MM was 
attempting to move away from the broadening of the original Mental Capacity Act 
values.497  
 
In attempting to consider what risks might be acceptable, courts have tried to strike a 
balance between local authority concerns and individual rights. In MM, Munby LJ 
asked “What good is it making someone safer if it merely makes them miserable?”498 
Munby’s powerful question identifies a resistance to paternalistic principles which 
endeavour to secure a particular outcome through restriction of risk. In attempting to 
enforce MM’s care plan, the local authority wanted to eliminate what it believed was 
the main risk in her life. However, given that this risk was her husband, the court 
rejected paternalistic pathways to reduce MM’s contact with him. Bartlett states that 
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the court specifically highlighted the importance of MM’s wishes and feelings.499 
Further, Bartlett acknowledges that the court, at paragraph 116, specifically warned 
against adoption of paternalism and assumptions that the state could make better care 
provision than families and carers.500  
 
The court reinforces that cases have to be decided on an individual basis. In both JH 
and MM, judges attributed considerable weight to long-term relationships. Although 
the women at the centre of each case lacked capacity, each was seen in the context 
of a long-term relationship and negative and positive factors were assessed. In JH, 
the husband was able to put forward his arguments to enable Mrs JH to return home. 
In MM, the Official Solicitor ensured the court saw how significant MM regarded her 
long-term relationship to be to her. The importance of giving vulnerable people a voice 
in court to argue against local authority decisions is critical. The court’s role is 
particularly important in cases where judges have to consider the position of 
vulnerable people and especially those without capacity.  
 
 
4(ii) Analysis of arguments around vulnerability and capacity 
 
Individual care recipients who lack capacity are particularly vulnerable to the wishes 
and opinions of other people with an interest in their care and this is highlighted when 
courts are asked to make ‘best interests’ decisions about their care.501 The definition 
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of best interests depends on interpretation of potentially differing opinions of 
individuals and professionals. Bartlett argues that best interests decisions are based 
on a wide variety of factors and many opinions are canvassed in the course of making 
them.502 One possible consequence of this process is that greater weight might be 
attributed to professional as opposed to lay arguments, leaving courts to strike an 
appropriate balance.  
 
In many cases local authorities have provided high levels of care, but this level of care 
is not always enough to enable a person to remain at home. In cases where capacity 
fluctuates, the role of care and the local authority can be difficult to balance and 
problematic because care will need to be adapted appropriately and the local authority 
need to plan for that. In Re KK; CC v KK, KK had longstanding complex needs 
including Parkinson’s disease, paralysis on her left side and vascular dementia.503  
The local authority had provided significant levels of care in order to keep her at home 
as long as possible. KK was deemed to use the care technology provided to her 
excessively and unnecessarily.504 KK had been provided with a ‘Lifeline’ system which 
allows the service user to alert carers in an emergency, usually through pressing a 
button on a device worn around the neck. KK had used her Lifeline system over a 
thousand times in six months.505 Most of the time she had used it for the purposes of 
reassurance because she was worried about something.506 Initially it was decided that 
moving to a residential home would be in her best interests.507 She returned home 
after a spell and again used the Lifeline too often. The pattern continued until the home 
                                                          
502 Bartlett (n497) 86. 
503 Re KK; CC v KK (n17).  
504 (n17) [4] (Baker LJ).  
505 (n17) [6] (Baker LJ).  
506 (n17) [6] (Baker LJ).  
507 (n17) [5] (Baker LJ). 
Laura Wares ʹ LLM by Research 
 
108 
 
made an urgent deprivation of liberty application under Schedule 1A of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005.508  
  
A previous hearing had enabled KK to spend time in her home during the day.509 The 
flexibility of this Care Plan was supported by Baker J who warned against adoption of 
paternalistic practices by local authorities.510 He stated “There is a risk that all 
professionals involved with treating and helping that person – including, of course, a 
judge in the Court of Protection – may feel drawn towards an outcome that is more 
protective of the adult and thus, in certain circumstances, fail to carry out an 
assessment of capacity that is detached and objective”.511 Baker LJ appears to warn 
against local authorities adopting a paternalistic approach as an alternative to a 
utilitarian outcome led focus based on reducing demand on resources. He 
acknowledged that while the doctor who conducted the capacity assessment 
expressed concerns about KK’s “vulnerability, loneliness, isolation and anxiety”, KK 
had been very clear about her understanding of the risks involved in remaining in her 
own home.512 The residential home’s Matron agreed that combining her stay with 
regular visits to her home was the “ideal care package” for KK.513  
 
KK’s legal representative made a similar argument to that in McDonald – the cheapest 
option, in KK a care home, can be presented as the safest solution. The appellant 
claimed that the Doctor’s conclusion had been heavily influenced by the consideration 
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of resources. It was contended the Local Authority, in a situation comparable to JH, 
had not offered different care packages other than their preferred option of residential 
care to KK, suggesting, once again, a utilitarian approach based on restricted 
resources.514 KK gave evidence in court. She complained she did not always find it 
easy to eat food given to her at home because it was often left at the back of a crowded 
table.515 Her Parkinson’s disease meant that she found it difficult to lift drinks 
independently. She objected to her food being mashed up and being expected to eat 
with a spoon when she could use a fork.516 KK illustrated an awareness of the risk to 
remaining at her home by stating that she would prefer to die at home as a result of a 
fall than live anywhere else.517  
  
Baker J found her evidence compelling.518 He decided KK had a clear comprehension 
of her needs and condition and the right to be particular about what she ate and 
drank.519 She illustrated an appreciation of risk through reluctance to visit her home 
during wet weather through the heightened risk of slipping.520  Baker J concluded that 
the professionals involved had placed too much emphasis on their own wishes. The 
Judge recognised that on at least one occasion KK had been subjected to 
unnecessary stress because she did not want to return to the residential home.521 On 
that occasion KK’s wishes had been ignored and conflict had ensued. The court 
                                                          
514 (n17) [35] (Baker LJ).  
515 (n17) [45] (Baker LJ). 
516 (n17) [45] (Baker LJ).  
517 (n17) [50] (Baker LJ).  
518 (n17) [64] (Baker LJ). 
519  (n17) [64 and 72] (Baker LJ).  
520  (n17) [73] (Baker LJ).  
521 (n17) [99] (Baker LJ).  
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acknowledged that KK was in an unusual situation in being able to spend time at home 
every day and she had a greater degree of freedom than most.522   
 
The singular position of courts in making decisions about an individual’s life torn 
between the views of the local authority and the wishes of an individual is recognised 
by Bangham. She argues that while the local authority and the professionals it 
consulted argued that KK did not have capacity, the court’s role was unique because 
it was able to evaluate all the evidence before it in an unbiased fashion.523 There is a 
utilitarian contention in this case involving the risk to KK if she remained in her own 
home and the savings the local authority could make if she was permanently in a care 
home. Bangham states that in relying on the evidence of a range of professionals, 
including social workers and doctors, weight will be attached to different factors.524 
The factors that professionals might deem important such as risk and money, may be 
seen in a different way by the individual. The court faces the challenge of picking apart 
these considerations and placing the importance of the individual back at the centre 
of discourse. Indeed Pack, a local authority lawyer and blogger, argues that best 
interests are highly subjective.525 He links the McDonald case to the adoption of 
paternalistic approaches of local authorities as providing a means to follow state 
agendas. It follows that if this agenda is a utilitarian one, then utilitarian outcomes, 
resources and risks will inform best interest determinations. In KK, professionals had 
concluded that KK lacked capacity but the court held that those opinions were not 
                                                          
522 (n17) [102] (Baker LJ).  
523 Bangham, S., Family Law Online [2013] www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/deprivation-of-
liberty-cc-v-kk-and-stcc-2012-ewhc-2136-cop-2012-coplr-627#.VzdRjPkrLiu  
524 Ibid.  
525 Suesspiciousminds An Englishwoman’s home is her castle (unless she is 82)? [2012] 
https:suesspiciousminds.com/tag/kk-v-stcc-2012/   
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determinative. Instead the court held KK’s oral reasoning to be particularly valuable to 
its considerations in evaluating KK’s levels of understanding.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to highlight the value of ever changing risk in care 
and comparing how that sits with the utilitarian backdrop of resources and outcomes. 
I argued that it is better to promote a more realistic understanding and acceptance of 
risk on an individual basis, avoiding blanket assumptions which direct care in an 
undesirable direction. Formulation of care plans must be realistic and sensitive to 
needs above resource and untenable risk arguments. In the next chapter I discuss 
utilitarian approaches to the problem of contemporary care in respect of care 
technologies. I evaluate the positive and negative aspects of technology and analyse 
it in comparison to the human touch. I discuss how practical technologies have been 
used as a utilitarian means to meet the challenge of contemporary care. I suggest that 
combined pressures of having fewer people able to care has been addressed in part 
by increased use of technology. I consider this particularly in connection with widely 
used technology such as hoists, examining both advantages and disadvantages of 
these for patients and carers. I also consider more elaborate technology including GPS 
and video surveillance, particularly when they are used to monitor dementia patients.  
The next chapter provides me with an opportunity to demonstrate my arguments in the 
context of a particular contemporary problem and the ways in which it has been utilised 
by the utilitarian state as a solution. I consider the effect of paternalism on those 
without capacity in terms of physical technology and identify feminist approaches as 
more conducive to effective care.  
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Chapter Five - The particular problem of contemporary care 
technology 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The final chapter contributes to the thesis by examining a contemporary dilemma in 
the delivery of care services, the problems associated with technological solutions to 
the provision of care. I argue that evaluations based on utilitarian and paternalistic 
approaches are inappropriate and consider whether feminist approaches would be 
more effective. My aim here is to highlight growing use of technology in care and 
identify reasons why I argue that it can be problematic. The increase in use of 
technology is partly as a result of recommendations made in care plans (discussed in 
the previous chapter). I consider how technology can be evaluated as a means of 
delivering care, examining whether it is dehumanising or empowering. I look at 
decisions to use technology rather than humans through the application of both 
utilitarianism and paternalism, arguing neither of these approaches are appropriate as 
evaluative tools. I argue that currently the ways we use technology to address 
problems in care are unsatisfactory. As an alternative I consider how feminist 
approaches, particularly those that value human responsiveness, are more conducive 
to resolving inevitable dilemmas in the use of care technology.   
 
The chapter begins by recognising increasing use of technology in care and how this 
affect recipients of care. I focus on two distinct technologies, hoists and surveillance. 
I analyse the benefits these can bring for those involved in care and consider some of 
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the associated problems. I use various unreported cases to support my claim that 
while technology can be valuable in care, it carries various complications which should 
not be underestimated. When discussing technology I use McShane’s arguments to 
support use of surveillance for those with dementia.526 I analyse O’Neill’s work who 
argues that great thought should be applied before applying surveillance to those 
without dementia.527 I analyse the effects on carers and care recipients, questioning 
who benefits from increased technology in care. I discuss utilitarian approaches to 
technology and evaluate how utilitarians balance the good and bad aspects of 
technology in care and whether these are effective in contemporary care. I apply 
similar considerations to paternalistic applications to care technology. Both utilitarian 
and paternalistic approaches to care technology will be understood in the context of 
dementia patients. In considering how these approaches operate in care, I consider 
how appropriate they are for those subject to care and what problems may arise as a 
result.  
 
The final section of this chapter evaluates care technology from a feminist perspective. 
I argue that applying a feminist approach is a more pertinent way to think about values 
and problems connected with care technologies. I consider how feminism places 
importance on the human touch and interactions.528 I use Bail’s argument that 
widespread technology should not be used without first considering the benefits to 
patients.529 I support my argument using Niemeijer’s work, who states that to improve 
                                                          
526 McShane, R., ‘Should people with dementia who wander be electronically tagged? Yes’ British 
Medical Journal [2013] 346; f603.  
527 O’Neill (n20) 606, 607.   
528 Astell (n23) 15-25.  
529 Bail, K.D., ‘Electronic tagging of people with dementia: devices may be preferable to locked doors’ 
British Medical Journal [2003] 326, 281. 
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care for those with dementia, there need to be deeper understandings of the condition 
rather than widespread application of surveillance.530  
 
2(i). The growing use of technology in care 
 
As far back as 1958 Arendt’s Human Condition considered the rapid development of 
technology.531 She suggested that advancement in technology affects our idea of what 
it is to be human and how our ideas of that might change in the future.532 Arendt 
appeared to be aware that technology had potential to have a significant impact on 
the human body.533 She appears to suggest that rapidly advancing technology would 
force people to question our physical limitations.534 Arendt identified the desire to 
escape the limitations our bodies impose on us biologically and to embrace scientific 
developments.535 Technology could have a critical part to play in alleviating the often 
complex needs of this group of people. It could also be useful in mitigating some of 
the difficulties associated with responsibilities of providing care.  
 
2(ii). Advantages of using hoists 
 
In recent decades there has been an increase in the use of a variety of technologies 
in care but these have not been unproblematic. There have been several unreported 
cases in the media involving the use of hoists which have illustrated the drawbacks of 
                                                          
530 Niemeijer (n21). 
531 Arendt, H., The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press 1958).  
532 Ibid 263. 
533 Arendt (n531) 261. 
534 Ibid 251. 
535 Arendt (n531) 250-251. 
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this kind of technology. Hoists are used to help lift and manoeuvre people in and out 
of chairs, beds and baths. They can be useful and have several advantages over 
manual lifting.536 Using hoists reduces the likelihood of physical injuries including back 
and muscle strains. It can be better for the cared for to be lifted in a hoist as it enables 
them to be lifted more easily. For example, there is no need to drag them across a bed 
using a sheet in order to pick them up.537 The individual is not subject to how far their 
carers can carry them but instead can be swung up and round in relative safety. Hoists 
are valuable as a lifting technology but are still reliant on correct technique, training 
and maintenance.  
 
There are advantages of using technology for carers as long as technology is used 
properly. In Thorley v Vicarage Residential Care Home a carer was hurt lifting a care 
recipient.538 Despite being given adequate training to use the hoist, a staff member 
chose to use a drag lifting method not sanctioned by the home, resulting in her 
sustaining a back injury. The carer argued that drag lifting had been used repeatedly 
in the past without consequence but the court refused to allow this as a defence.539 
Drag lifting has been stopped as a means of moving individuals because it can lead 
to harm, including causing bruising and tears in delicate skin. The carer had not 
followed the home’s policy, instead using a method which increased risk to herself and 
care recipients. The court refused her compensation claim as she had chosen to use 
a riskier method not advocated by the care home.  
 
                                                          
536 Equipment for moving and handling people page 192 
http://www.acc.co.nz/PRD_EXT_CSMP/groups/external_ip/documents/guide/wpc108939.pdf 
537 This practice is known as drag lifting and involves a person being lifted under their arms.  
538 Unreported case, January 2010.  
539 Where a person is pulled up by lifting them under their arms.  
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2(iii). Drawbacks associated with using hoists 
 
There have been several cases where technology has not been used appropriately 
with catastrophic results.540 I have identified examples from health and safety law to 
highlight some issues. The first case carried the headline ‘Care home and its boss 
fined £337k after 100 year old died falling from hoist’.541 The report involved a care 
home in Bedfordshire whose Managing Director pleaded guilty during a Health and 
Safety investigation to not training nurses properly. Nurses at the home had not 
received specific training in respect of this particular hoist (despite previous generic 
hoist training).  
 
The case highlights that changes in technology must be supported by appropriate 
training and guidance for each new piece of equipment. The patient here suffered from 
dementia and would often become flustered and unhappy when being moved. On this 
occasion she had not been strapped in properly and fell five feet from the hoist to the 
floor. Foster J at Luton Crown Court said that she “died as a result of an avoidable 
accident”.542 The judge’s comment focuses on the fact the hoist was not the problem 
but lack of training.  
 
In a second unreported case, a Bupa care home was fined £100,000 plus £50,000 
costs because of an accident involving a hoist.543 Here a patient fell out of a sling while 
                                                          
540 The Care Quality Commission made its first prosecution of a care home in June 2016 
https://www.cqc.org.uk/content/care-provider-prosecuted 
541 The Daily Telegraph (March 2015).  
542 Daily Telegraph (n541).  
543 Care home operator fined £100,000 for hoist death (n18).  
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a carer bent to pick up the patient’s slippers. The second carer was standing behind 
the hoist and was not able to prevent the fall. The resulting investigation found that 
required fixings had not been used and staff had not been properly trained to use the 
hoist. The Health and Safety Inspector stated that “Working in a care home is a 
specialised job, which involves dealing with vulnerable people. Care homes must 
ensure that they have the correct training in place for all their employees”.544 Emphasis 
was placed on the fact that even when technology is in good working order it is 
imperative that staff can use it appropriately. Technology cannot be used in a vacuum 
and so the critical connection between human beings and technology should not be 
underestimated.   
 
As well as the importance of ensuring up to date staff training, technology must 
maintained and replaced as it ages. A fifteen year old sling was found to be defective 
in an unreported case from January 2013.545 An investigation found in addition to 
insufficient training, the hoist had not been regularly checked or maintained and was 
in an unacceptable state. The Health and Safety Inspectorate commented that “With 
properly maintained equipment, better training and supervision, this incident was 
easily preventable”.546 The two sisters who owned the home were each fined £50,000 
with £20,000 costs. It is noteworthy that each of the above cases were investigated as 
breaches of Health and Safety legislation as opposed to negligence or under social 
care law. It is critical to recognise that in each case discussed, failure to provide staff 
with satisfactory training led to the deaths of patients. It can be seen that while practical 
                                                          
544 Care home operator fined £100,000 for hoist death (n18). 
545 ‘Big fines after hoist death’, www.mackworth-healthcare.com/big-fines-after-hoist-death/2013. 
(January 11th 2013). 
546 Ibid. 
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technologies can be beneficial in care, they need to be used safely and by trained 
staff. I now consider the effects of a different type of care technology, electronic 
surveillance, which prompts concerns in connection to those without capacity.  
 
3(i). The advantages of surveillance technology 
 
In recent years there has been a growth in the amount of electronic surveillance used 
in different care settings.547 They have been increasingly utilised in order to keep a 
watchful eye on people, especially those without capacity.548 One of the simplest and 
most cost effective forms of surveillance currently available are Global Positioning 
System trackers which can be fitted onto walking sticks for example.549 An anecdotal 
story recounted to me concerns a family living in Australia with an older family member 
still living in the UK. He has dementia and lives in a care home. His family can use the 
GPS device in his walking stick to monitor where he is any time of the day or night. 
The family find this gives them a source of comfort and reassurance. Another 
anecdotal story concerns a woman with dementia using sensor technology at night to 
enable her to live in her own home. When carers are not present during the night, she 
has a sensor pad on her bed which activates should she be out of bed for more than 
twenty minutes. An alarm is triggered, alerting her daughter who can go to her home 
to check on her. Anecdotal evidence suggests technology can be useful in helping 
                                                          
547 Social Care Institute of Excellence Electronic Surveillance in health and social care settings: a brief 
review (2014) 6  
https://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/CM111408_Item_8_Surveillance_literature_review_Appen_3
.pdf 
548 Discussed later in this chapter.  
549 Hereafter these will be referred to as GPS. 
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families feel more secure about the well-being of their loved one, as well as enhancing 
the individual’s independence.   
 
McShane argues this kind of tagging is an effective remedy in supervising those with 
dementia.550 He argues that high levels of stress caused when a person becomes 
disorientated and wanders off justifies the use of GPS devices. Anxiety is experienced 
not only by the individual but also carers and family members. McShane points out 
that GPS trackers are cheap, easy to use and enable individuals to be found more 
quickly.551 McShane suggests trackers are preferable to the alternative of sedation 
because medication is not an adequate remedy for those that wander as it does not 
prevent them getting lost. He recommends the use of boundary alarms which allow 
individuals to walk up to a specific distance before an alarm alerts a carer to their 
whereabouts. Nonetheless he notes that if technology fails and does not alert carers 
the security of these options is notably reduced.552  
 
3(ii). Arguments against surveillance  
 
Despite the advantages of surveillance, particularly for families of dementia patients, 
ethical questions arise. O’Neill argues tagging loses sight of individuals and has come 
to be seen as a “quick fix”.553 The correct response to wandering should not be to 
simply restrict individuals by locking doors.554 Adopting this approach suggests a 
                                                          
550 McShane (n526) 603. 
551 Ibid 603. 
552 McShane (n526) 603. 
553 O’Neill (n20) 606. 
554 Ibid 606. 
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desire to simply prevent wandering rather than trying to understand why individuals 
wander. Nevertheless O’Neill recognises that in some circumstances wandering can 
lead to greater risk and can upset patients, carers and families.555 His fear is that 
tagging will be seen as a satisfactory response to the issue of wandering and there is 
a danger that it will become widespread in the same way sedatives did in the past.556  
 
 O’Neill argues we should steer away from assumptions about what is best in care 
services and there should be wider debate about the causes of wandering.557 His work 
supports my argument that financial constraints should not be a primary factor in good 
care provision. Nonetheless the arguments above suggest that sometimes monetary 
concerns seem to be less of a consideration than knowing that a person is safe. 
However, ethical complications of tagging those that lack capacity should not be 
underestimated. Tagging should not be a blanket means of monitoring those with 
dementia. McShane’s work supports this argument, noting that relatively few dementia 
patients (5%) get lost more than once.558 On this basis, tagging all dementia patients 
would be disproportionate and unjust.  
 
4(i). Utilitarianism and technology 
 
As discussed in the first chapter, utilitarianism was both reformist and progressive by 
standards at the time it was introduced. We could surmise that utilitarians would 
welcome increased use of technology in care as that could be viewed as progressive. 
                                                          
555 O’Neill (n20) 606. 
556 Ibid 607. 
557 O’Neill (n20) 606. 
558 McShane (n526) 603. 
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If we consider use of tagging or similar surveillance devices in relation to those with 
dementia we can see how potentially dangerous it would be to accept technology 
without question.559 Individuals who have dementia are in a vulnerable position 
because they are less likely than those without dementia to be able to engage in active 
discourse. The ability to engage actively generally decreases as dementia progresses 
and individuals may not able to judge the advantages or disadvantages of tagging 
appropriately.  
 
 Given the relatively small amount of dementia patients that wander, having an 
automatic assumption they should all be tagged is equally concerning.560 Dementia 
patients will be particularly subject to the opinions and decisions of others.561 There 
has been a tendency in some areas to infantilise dementia sufferers in the past.562 
Treating dementia patients this way has not necessarily been intended to be 
derogatory but could blind carers to what the individual requires for their wellbeing.563 
The utilitarian stance is inappropriate because it fails to look at people as individuals, 
a necessity in good care. I argue that where people have dementia, the need for 
responsiveness to individuals is critical because of the nature of the illness. What is 
needed instead of blanket adoption of surveillance technology are better 
understandings of dementia in order to develop better care.564 As we have seen, the 
                                                          
559 Particularly if we assume all technology is good and fail to analyse the benefits for the individual. 
560 I am not suggesting that all patients are tagged at present but warning against treating those 
individuals as a group as a result of their diagnosis. I am arguing against making blanket assumptions 
because of a certain condition. In my view, any homogenous treatment which fails to recognise the 
needs of the individual are inappropriate in care.  
561 O’Neill (n20) 606.  
562 Astell (n23) 7. 
563 O’Neill (n20) 606.  
564 Niemeijer (n21) 128.    
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utilitarian state tends to label people in groups, applying resources accordingly. In care 
this is inappropriate generally but significantly detrimental in dementia care.565  
 
The utilitarian approach would see clear benefits in having the security of cost effective 
methods of surveillance on a broad scale. As Jonsen notes, the utilitarian state would 
be likely to evaluate care technologies on the basis of price.566 Technology of this kind 
can offer peace of mind to families and carers if care recipients are inclined to wander. 
If surveillance is uncomplicated more carers could use them without the need for 
extensive, time consuming training. If reliable technology could be used along these 
lines the utilitarian regime would be more likely to encourage it. In a cash strapped 
care landscape it could be argued that it makes a lot of sense in terms of not having 
to be watched over by busy care staff.    
 
In examining utilitarian approaches to technology in care it is useful to recall that the 
theory focuses on what will produce happiness.567 It should be remembered this will 
be deemed as good based on the happiness of the majority however, not the 
minority.568 In respect of physical care provided by carers, utilitarian approaches would 
focus on whether technology could reduce pressure on them. The utilitarian viewpoint 
would take the path that if technology is available to make care work easier, it should 
be embraced. If we reduce this to its simplest conclusion we could argue that 
technology has been developed and is there to be used.569 Unfortunately this narrow 
                                                          
565 Niemeijer (n21) 115. 
566 Jonsen, A, R., ‘Bentham in a Box: Technology Assessment and Health Care Allocation’ L.Med. 
and Health Care [1986] 14 172.  
567 Identified in chapter one. 
568 Beauchamp, D, E., ‘Public Health as Social Justice’ Inquiry [1976] 3-14.  
569 Niemeijer (n21) identifies an increase in care technology development from the 1980s to the 
millennium and beyond. 
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application overlooks the fact that care is a responsive practice and fails to consider 
the nuances and individual nature of care. Although technology can enhance care in 
some respects there need not be an assumption that it is the best way to progress.570 
By failing to take into account the wishes and needs of the cared for we are not going 
to be in a position to provide the optimal care they deserve. The utilitarian state, 
promoting blanket policies, cannot react rapidly enough to changes in technology to 
enable it to provide effective care.  
 
4(ii). Technology and paternalism 
 
Assessing utilitarian attitudes to technology, it is important to consider another 
deleterious approach to care, paternalism, because it is often applied where 
utilitarianism is not appropriate. I consider issues surrounding paternalism specifically 
in the context of dementia care.571 There is evidence that there is a tendency to adopt 
protectionist attitudes to individuals with dementia, which stems from the aversion of 
risk but also ideas that those with dementia have somehow reverted to babyhood.572 
As a result, dementia patients are framed as being unable to exercise their own 
autonomy or choice and dignity becomes a side issue.573 Yet it is crucial that intentions 
concerned with minimisation of risk to individuals do not result in complete eradication 
of risk.574 If this approach becomes the primary basis of providing care instead of 
                                                          
570 Niemeijer (n21) 27. 
571 Discussed in chapter four. 
572 Reisberg, B., Kenowsky, S., Franssen, E.H., Auer, S.R., Souren, L.E., ‘Towards a science of 
Alzheimer’s disease management: a model based upon current knowledge of retrogenesis’ 
International Psychogeriatrics [1999] 11:7.  
573 Hughes and Louw (n19) 847.  
574 Niemeijer (n21) 65.   
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individual need, care becomes a means of control and management.575 Although it is 
recognised that safety is a significant factor in care, quality of life should be evaluated. 
Safety should not be permitted to outweigh autonomy purely through a desire to keep 
a person in one place rather than permit them to wander within a certain area.576 It is 
perhaps this view that led to the sedation of those with dementia in the past. 
Nevertheless it should not be an automatic response that the best way to care is to 
keep someone sitting in a chair or locking doors.577  
 
Tagging is of particular concern because it is being used for people who may not have 
any say in the matter or even knowledge of it.578 Paternalistic notions that tagging is 
the answer overlooks the fact that we still do not know why individuals wander.579 
Astell supports this, arguing that if we could identify what triggers the desire to wander 
we could provide better individualised care rather than imposing expectations on 
patients.580 She argues care should be focused on the individual and not the way we 
want care to work as caregivers.581 Such a change in approach would require a 
conscious move towards practice of responsive person centred care. It is critical to my 
argument that those with dementia do not need to be managed, instead needing 
responsive and intuitive care in line with feminist thinking. Paternalistic approaches 
tend to focus on managing and control but fail to acknowledge individuals at the heart 
                                                          
575 Hughes and Louw (n19) 847.  
576 Niemeijer (n21) 27. 
577 Astell (n23) 6. 
578 McShane (n526) 604. He identifies a situation where a wife tags her unwitting husband when he 
goes out alone.  
579 O’Neill (n20) 606. 
580 Astell (n23) 6. 
581 Ibid 13.  
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of care.582 We can identify this approach through the application of best interests which 
depends on views of professionals, families and carers.583  
 
Paternalistic arguments in respect of technology might consider whether the need for 
it is more beneficial to carers or the cared for.584 As discussed, use of hoists can be 
seen as positive for carers as it can diminish the risk of injury. That argument is 
compelling because injuries which affect the back can have lasting effects, limiting a 
person’s mobility. Yet this is only useful where carers receive appropriate and regular 
training to use these devices. In evaluating benefits of technology we need to think 
about who is benefitting and what the consequences are when technology fails or 
human error occurs. In the case of R (on the application of A) v East Sussex CC, the 
council appeared to have adopted a paternalistic approach in its attitude towards the 
parents.585 East Sussex County Council had been happy for the parents to care for 
their two daughters at home but tried to impose its handling requirements on them.586 
The parents objected, not least because on one occasion one of the daughters had 
begun to slip through the sling and on another, under water while in the bath.587 The 
council believed that its policy should be followed and resisted the parents’ feelings 
that manual handling was a better way to care for their daughters. The case highlights 
the need to recognise the wishes of individuals in care settings and the importance of 
balancing requirements in each particular case. Instead of rejecting the desire to lift 
their daughters manually, the court recognised that a better approach would look at 
                                                          
582 Niemeijer (n20) 55.  
583 Enshrined in s4 Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
584 Niemeijer (n20) 55. 
585 R (on the application of A) v East Sussex County Council (No.2) 6 CCL Rep 194.   
586 (n585) [8].  
587 (n585) [20].  
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how to minimise risks when manual lifting was taking place.588 For these reasons it is 
difficult to see how a paternalistic approach is appropriate in care because it neglects 
to give adequate scrutiny to individual needs. A paternalistic attitude assumes those 
in positions of power, including carers and families, can make decisions for those 
directly involved in care.  Niemeijer argues that we should avoid believing this 
approach is best for patients.589 He acknowledges that in care, one person will always 
be in a more vulnerable position than another. He warns against assuming that 
vulnerable people no longer possess any autonomy or their own opinions.590  
 
5. The value of the human touch 
 
When discussing developing technology in care and increasing use, we need to 
evaluate how this might affect caring human interactions. Tronto advocated 
responsive and reciprocal care practice as the basis of good care.591 If we accept this, 
we must question whether technology can become a substitute for the real physical 
touch of a person. As discussed earlier, using care technology is not a straightforward 
answer in itself. Bail argues we should not fail to address ethical issues simply because 
of refinements in technology which allow wider use in care.592 Bail describes the vast 
array of technology available to carers and care institutions.593 Technologies include 
devices as simple as locking doors through to complex alarm systems and use of video 
                                                          
588 (n585) [131].  
589 Niemeijer (n21) 55.  
590 Ibid 55. 
591 Tronto (n244).  
592 Bail (n529) 281.  
593 Ibid 281. 
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surveillance. If we consider the criticisms of Bail594, Astell595 and McShane596 in 
relation to using sedation and widespread use of physical restraints597, a more ‘hands 
off’ approach might be considered preferable. Sedatives can have powerful side 
effects and restraints can cause injury and distress in some circumstances.598 
Alternative use of GPS trackers allows individuals to wander more independently and 
free staff from having to follow them to monitor safety. The benefits of GPS allows staff 
to undertake other activities while permitting wandering to a relatively safe degree. 
The patient themselves might prefer to wander alone and not be followed around or 
coaxed back to a particular place.599 However, benefits of human carers to recognise 
needs and react appropriately is one that cannot be replaced by technology. 
 
Only a human being can be responsive to increased risk of falls in different 
circumstances, recognising stumbles and moving to offer support. Niemeijer noted in 
his ethnographic study that care staff were reluctant to rely too heavily on technology, 
preferring more reciprocal approaches to care.600  Technology has made significant 
inroads in care and helped to free up time in domestic homes but is currently unable 
to replicate natural human responsiveness. Lanchester argues technology has clear 
advantages, alleviating the burden of heavy, repetitive work and evolving 
constantly.601 Despite powerful advancements in development of humanised robots 
there is still a long way to go before they can ape a human being’s responses in the 
                                                          
594 Bail (n529) 281. 
595 Astell (n23) 8. 
596 McShane (n526) 603. 
597 Bail (n529) 281.  
598 Ibid 281. 
599 McShane (n526) 604. He discusses a man who prefers to go out alone rather than with his wife all 
the time.  
600 Niemeijer (n21) 89. 
601 ‘The Robots are Coming’ London Review of Books [2015] Vol. 37, No. 5, 5th March, 3, 8.   
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same way.602 Responsiveness is critical in good care practice and it is difficult to see 
how technology could replace that, no matter the advances made. Technology should 
not be utilised as a means of replacing care staff as this is an asset to everyone 
involved in caring relationships.603 The value of a touch, a smile or just a few words 
should not be underestimated.604 Human contact is significant for those who lack 
capacity to express their wants and needs.  
 
The value of balancing technology against manual care of people has been recognised 
in the courts. In R (on the application of A) v East Sussex CC (No.2) the family carers 
wanted to lift their daughters manually while the Council advocated use of a hoist.605 
The family argued the Council’s policy failed to consider individual needs and previous 
use of hoists had led to harm.606 In acknowledging the importance of the human touch 
in care Munby LJ said “I recognise of course that the compassion of the carer is itself 
a vital aspect of our humanity and dignity and that at a very deep level of our instinctive 
feelings we value and need the caring touch of the human hand”.607 Munby LJ placed 
considerable value on preferences for manual handling and stated that a “human 
being is more than a machine” and this could be “why we have an instinctive and 
intuitive preference for the touch of the human hand rather than the assistance of a 
machine”.608 These quotes make persuasive arguments for the importance of people 
in care and accepting that while technology can be an aid to care, it cannot replace 
human beings.  
                                                          
602 Top Ten Humanised Robots Designed To Match Human Capabilities and Emotions, by Easton 
(March 2015) https://wtvox.com/robotics/top-10-humanoid-robots/ Accessed September 25th 2015.  
603 Niemeijer (n21) 33.  
604 Astell (n23) 13.  
605 R (on the application of A) v East Sussex CC (No.2) [2003] 6 CCL Rep 194.  
606 (n605) [15] Munby LJ. 
607 (n605) [120] (Munby LJ).  
608 (n605) [120] (Munby LJ).  
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I advance the argument of my thesis by illustrating that utilitarian ways 
of thinking about the application of care technology can be inappropriate. Instead I 
present feminist arguments based on importance of the human touch and reciprocity. 
I sought to explore how development of technology in care has been advanced and 
refined. I chose to focus on hoists and surveillance because of their widespread but 
different use in care. In considering the implications of using hoists, the practical 
benefits to carers and care recipients seemed fairly obvious. They alleviate stress and 
strain that lifting inflicts on both and can save time. Through the unreported cases 
highlighted, we can see significant problem areas associated with this piece of 
technology. Problems revolved around staff being provided with adequate training and 
keeping that updated when new equipment was bought.609 Additionally we saw the 
impact that poor maintenance has in care situations.610 It seems evident that if we are 
going to increasingly use technology in care, we need to ensure that we keep carers 
up to date with progress and maintenance. In relation to surveillance, the questions 
seem to concentrate on more abstract notions of autonomy and economy. There are 
significant ethical issues connected to the care of those with dementia. The fact that 
often dementia patients lack capacity means they are subject to the wishes of others. 
Surveillance is a contentious area because it has a myriad of concerns attached to it, 
including dignity, privacy and reduction of contact between carers and patients.   
 
                                                          
609 Care Quality Commission prosecution (n540). 
610 Daily Telegraph (n541).  
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In examining utilitarian and paternalistic attitudes to care technology, I argued that 
neither of these adequately evaluate its use. The utilitarian system is too focused on 
economic concerns to allow a nuanced and appropriately receptive approach. In 
prioritising the cost effective models, it misses the importance of care based on 
individual need and responsiveness. The paternalistic approach is equally poor 
because it considers those with dementia as a group with a similar set of needs. 
Paternalism considers those with dementia as displaying behaviour which needs to be 
controlled and managed. Paternalism fails to try and understand what initially triggers 
this behaviour and respond to it appropriately. The paternalistic attitude places 
dementia patients in one group and carers and families in another.   
 
I have presented feminist considerations of care technology and explored some of the 
problems associated with different types. One of the objectives of this chapter is to 
advance the importance of the human touch in care. Although I recognise technology 
can be beneficial, I argue it should act as an enhancement in care, not as a 
replacement for carers.  I acknowledge there is a balancing act to be considered in 
relation to each piece of technology. We must consider for whose benefit it is being 
utilised and whether desires of carers and families should be curtailed. If we want to 
encourage an emphasis on person centred care with the individual at the heart, we 
need to consider the benefits for that individual. As a result this approach would, in 
line with feminist principles, have to take place ideally on a case by case basis with as 
many pros and cons as possible necessarily scrutinised. Technology can be a 
valuable asset in care and it is not my intention to dismiss it or consider it to be bad, 
but we must remember that the individual must come first. The responsive nature of 
care is unique to human beings and that should be of critical importance. I have shown 
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that utilitarianism and its alternative, paternalism, cannot provide the thoughtful 
response to technology that is required in care provision. Feminist approaches have 
more potential for progressive responses to dilemmas of contemporary care.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis argues that utilitarianism informs how the state thinks about care and that 
this is significantly damaging. Until the state thinks about care differently, solutions to 
the crisis in the provision of care will not be found.611 My work is important because 
care provision in its current format is unsustainable in the long term. Utilitarianism, I 
argue, with its emphasis on distributing resources to maximise individual welfare and 
on resource constraints has imbued contemporary care decisions. I propose a more 
nuanced and intuitive feminist approach which could lead to more progressive 
outcomes in care because it would cultivate resilience and promote human interaction 
and responsiveness in care provision. A feminist approach would enhance the 
importance of the individual at the heart of care and emphasise the critical nature of 
human embodiment. 
 
My argument is a feminist argument.  I evaluate how care has traditionally become an 
expectation of women as a result of the utilitarian system and the problems this has 
led to in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Women’s priorities have changed and 
they are far more likely to work on a full-time basis. Nonetheless, the expectation they 
should remain responsible for care within the family has not shifted in the same way. 
I examine how other countries with similar issues have begun to attempt to tackle the 
problem and consider how effective they have been.  
                                                          
611 The crisis in care covers many factors, including under-funding, neglect, abuse and lack of 
appropriate services and effective care provision. There has not been scope in this work to consider 
all these factors but they are all critical to a rethinking of care. Care in Crisis – What’s next for adult 
social care? Age UK (January 2014). http://www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/EN-
GB/Campaigns/CIC/PDF%20Care%20in%20Crisis%20-
%20What%20next%20for%20social%20care%202014.pdf?dtrk=true  Accessed 16th September 2016. 
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In considering technologies of care, I evaluate how local authorities implement care 
plans and the response of the courts when these were challenged. I consider that 
arguments of what might be seen as acceptable risk have been replaced by 
paternalistic approaches under the guise of safety. In connection with documentary 
technology I also considered more practical technologies and compared them to 
feminist care values. It is easy to see how technology has been viewed as a solution 
to problems in care but it has become an emerging problem in itself. Feminism is a 
more productive way to think about how we should apply care technology. Technology 
has a place in care but it should be used in conjunction with carers who promote good 
care through distinctly human relationships, not as a substitute for carers. I conclude 
that a utilitarian basis for care provision is no longer adequate and instead a feminist 
approach should be considered as a framework for state care provision. 
 
The first chapter introduces utilitarianism and explains how it came to be incorporated 
into the UK welfare state. Although I recognise that utilitarianism was progressive at 
the time it was introduced, its focus on maximisation of happiness for the majority 
allows the needs of individuals to be overlooked. The utilitarian spotlight on male 
actors engaged in the paid workforce continues to provide the basis for the paradigm 
legal subject in the twenty-first century. That subject is valuable economically but in 
contrast, anyone who does not fit that ideal model is not viewed as beneficial in the 
same way. Additionally, a framework based on male interests has meant that women 
have been consistently viewed as less important. The consequences have been 
particularly significant in areas like care which affect women disproportionately. I argue 
that while the welfare state did offer positive opportunities for change, as it has 
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expanded so has the level of bureaucracy associated with it. Anyone wishing to 
challenge local authority decisions can find it extremely difficult to penetrate the layers 
of complexity that surround social care decisions. I argue that utilitarian normative 
male standards have been evident in judicial thinking and use the case of McDonald 
to highlight how utilitarian rationality, based on resources and outcomes, were evident 
in the Court’s majority deliberations.  
 
The second chapter contributes to the thesis by identifying two feminist theories, the 
ethics of care and vulnerability theory, which underscore the relationality and 
vulnerability inherent in all human beings. I use other feminist arguments to support 
my claims that these approaches present the most appropriate way forward for 
effective transformation of care. I argue that care is a feminist issue through gendered 
expectations as well as the ways in which caring responsibilities impact on women as 
they grow older. I argue that to establish effective changes in the way care is thought 
about, men need to be encouraged and enabled to care too. I do not claim that either 
the ethics of care or vulnerability approaches are perfect theories and identify some 
particular critiques which I believe are relevant to my argument. I claim that if care can 
be considered as a concern which affects us all, regardless of gender, then it can be 
repositioned in society’s thinking as a valuable, public concern which demands open, 
considered debate.  
 
The third chapter builds on the second chapter by reinforcing the impact that feminism 
could have in promoting more nuanced approaches to care. It also explores how other 
countries have applied what could be perceived as feminist principles in order to 
transform care policies. In this chapter I identify the extent of care needs in the UK and 
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the difference in numbers between those who receive formal care (through residential 
or other care services) and those that have care needs but are receiving informal care. 
There has been a simultaneous increase in the private care provision market. 
Unfortunately, expansion of the market has not improved the position of those 
employed as carers.  
 
The ethics of care as considered in this chapter highlights the importance of trust and 
reciprocity in care, as well as relationships between care givers and care recipients. I 
argue that the ethics of care views care as much more than something which should 
be restricted to the private domain. If care is seen as private, it reinforces the silent, 
marginal position of women involved in care practice. I also evaluate how other 
countries with similar contemporary care problems have tried to implement changes. 
The Netherlands particularly seems to have adopted an approach akin to the ethics of 
care, introducing gender neutral, flexible work policies to enable both genders to 
provide care. Nonetheless, I note that care remains considered as a primarily private, 
family responsibility in the Netherlands, suggesting that there is still some way to go.  
 
The fourth chapter contributes to the thesis by discussing how risk has become a 
dominant concern with care provision, and how risk arguments are approached in a 
way that is consistent with utilitarian principles. My argument is that in care, as in life 
generally, it is not possible to eliminate risk completely and indeed it is not desirable 
to do so. I argue that a better basis for thinking about risk taking in care provision 
would be to carry out a case by case analysis of risk, always made in the context of 
the particular individual. As such, risk would be measured more appropriately, 
potentially enhancing care.  
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I argue that care plans are a legal technology which have significant impacts on 
individual lives and must be sensitive to their needs. I use case law to illustrate how 
care plans have sometimes been used to frame both family members and individuals 
as risky as a means for local authorities to implement their care plans. I analyse the 
contrasting approach of the courts, recognising that courts will place a heavy weight 
on the value of family relationships and realistic understandings of risk. I suggest that 
instead of local authorities formulating care plans which are designed to avoid risk, 
especially when risk is connected to resources, they must centre the needs of the 
individual at the heart of the care plan.  
 
 
In the final chapter of this thesis I consider a particular contemporary issue within care 
provision, the use of technology to test my argument that a feminist approach would 
provide a more nuanced way to determine whether or not the use of technology 
enhances the human practice of care. I note how utilitarianism has formed the basis 
for decisions about the appropriateness of care technology.   I argue that this has been 
a response to the problems in care caused by a shortage of carers as well as 
constrained resources. I focus on two distinct kinds of technology, hoists and 
surveillance, evaluating the pros and cons of each for both carers and care recipients. 
I discuss cases where care practice has failed due to inappropriate knowledge and 
maintenance of hoists. I argue that this highlights the importance of carers being able 
to interact appropriately with care technology and that this should be a continuous 
process. In relation to surveillance I argued that ethical dilemmas should be at the 
forefront of considerations, particularly where care recipients lack capacity. I claim that 
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often paternalism steps in to replace utilitarian rationality where those without capacity 
are concerned and argue that this fails to address or consider individuals.  
 
As an alternative I discuss a feminist approach to care in relation to the human touch. 
I argue that human carers should be essential to good care practice with practical 
technology providing support as and when required. I argue that technology should be 
used alongside carers but on an individually considered basis, evaluating exactly how 
the care recipient will benefit. I claim that feminist approaches to care prioritise the 
person at the centre of care and emphasises the nuanced human responsiveness that 
only reciprocal care can bring. I argue that as a framework for good care, feminist 
approaches offer the most appropriate means to develop sustainable systems of care 
into the future.  
 
In conclusion, I have found that a utilitarian basis for care is at the root of some of the 
most significant problems in contemporary care. I suggest that the double effect of 
expecting women to continue caring responsibilities while also being active in the paid 
workforce is unsustainable, both at present and in the future. In addition, the utilitarian 
focus on resources is detrimental in care because it has the effect of preventing good 
care provision, instead expecting those subject to it to make the best of inadequate 
situations. As a result I present feminist arguments as an effective alternative. The 
feminist theories I identify emphasise the very human nature of care, placing critical 
importance on the value of trust and reciprocity. I argue that recognition of human 
embodiment and relationships is an essential part of care and too often this is lost 
when resources are allowed to overtake as a consideration.  
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I discuss the way in which risk is considered and state that it is used inappropriately 
as a means of imposing care plans. I conclude that care would be far more sensitive 
to individual need if it was accepted more widely that risk is a normal part of life and 
might actually be beneficial to care recipients to a degree. In addition to more realistic 
approaches to risk, I conclude that although technology can provide clear advantages 
in care practice, it can only be used in close conjunction with human care givers. Care 
givers must be properly trained and that should be an ongoing process as technology 
advances. Furthermore I conclude that where technology is used in care for individuals 
that lack capacity, more abstract ethical considerations should be analysed before 
implementation. Fundamentally I argue that care should be revaluated as a 
necessarily human practice, placing human responsiveness and contact at its core. I 
believe that this can only be achieved through feminist approaches to the 
transformation of care.  
 
To take this work further I would like to explore care systems in other countries with 
similar problems in contemporary care in more depth. I would particularly like to focus 
on how far these can be said to have a feminist aspect and how that could be applied 
to the UK in the future. My work would also provide a good basis for more detailed and 
extensive analysis of care technology, especially in connection with provision of care 
for those that lack capacity. I believe that care recipients without capacity are notably 
vulnerable in care provision, susceptible to the wishes and intentions of others in a 
unique way. As such I feel that this thesis would act as an excellent basis from which 
to begin for further study. 
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